HOLODOMOR OF 1932-33 IN UKRAINE
DOCUMENTS AND MATERIALS
Compiled by Prof. Ruslan Pyrih
Translated by Stephen Bandera
Translated by Stephen Bandera
Kyiv Mohyla Academy Publishing House
Kyiv, 2008.
Kyiv, 2008.
- - -
- Jan. 3, 1932 - Resolution of CC CP(b)U on grain procurement
- Feb. 10, 1932 - Letter to Stalin from Komsomol member Pastushenko, Polonyste village, Baban raion, Vinnitsa oblast, on the requisition of grain and starving collective farmers (excerpt)
- Mar. 12, 1932 - Report from German Consulate in Kharkiv to the Embassy of Germany in the USSR on the agricultural situation (excerpt)
- Apr. 28, 1932 - Summary of letters on grain procurements and famine from the Agitation and Mass Campaigns Department to CC CP(b)U
- May 8, 1932 - Report from Vinnitsa oblast GPU to the CP(b)U oblast committee on famine and death in Trostianets raion
- May 20, 1932 - Letter from CC CP(b)U Deputy Richytsky on mass famine, death and cannibalism in Uman raion, Vinnytsia oblast
- Jun. 10, 1932 - Letter from Petrovsky to Molotov and Stalin on the grave food situation and famine in the Ukrainian SSR (excerpts)
- Jun. 10, 1932 - Letter from Chubar to Molotov and Stalin on agricultural affairs in Ukrainian SSR (excerpts)
- Jun. 12, 1932 - Letter from Kaganovich to Stalin on appeals from Ukrainian SSR leaders to CC AUCP(b) (excerpt)
- Jun. 15, 1932 - Letter from Stalin to Kaganovich on Appeal from Ukrainian SSR leaders to CC AUCP(b) (excerpt)
- Jun. 16, 1932 - Letter from Kaganovich to Stalin on grain procurement preparations in the Ukrainian SSR (excerpt)
- Jul. 2, 1932 - Letter from Stalin to Kaganovich and Molotov on the Ukrainian SSR leadership
- Jul. 6, 1932 - Letter from Molotov and Kaganovich to Stalin on the Ukrainian Party conference and grain procurement plan
- Jul. 6, 1932 - Resolution of the CC CP(b)U Politburo on grain procurement target
- Jul. 6, 1932 - Telegram from Molotov and Kaganovich to Stalin on covering-up the real state of affairs in the Ukrainian SSR
- Jul. 15, 1932 - Letter from Belarusian workers to the CC CP(b)U on starving Ukrainians in their republic
- Jul. 15, 1932 - Letter from Stalin to Kaganovich and Molotov on CC CP(b)U leadership (excerpt)
- Jul. 17, 1932 - Report from Vinnytsia oblast Prosecutor to the Ukrainian SSR Prosecutor on cannibalism in Nove Misto
- Aug. 7, 1932 - Resolution “On safekeeping property of state enterprises, collective farms and cooperatives and strengthening public (socialist) property" (excerpt)
- Aug. 11, 1932 - Letter from Stalin to Kaganovich on changing Ukrainian SSR leadership (excerpt)
- Aug. 16, 1932 - Letter from Kaganovich to Stalin on personnel changes in the Ukrainian SSR
- Aug. 27, 1932 - Telegram from Deputy USSR SNK Chairman ordering faster grain exports from Ukraine
- Sep. 17, 1932 - Resolution of AUCP(b) Politburo on expelling a foreign journalist
- Sep. 23, 1932 - Telegram from SNK USSR and CC AUCP(b) denying sowing seed loans to collective farms
- Oct. 22, 1932 - Resolution of CC AUCP(b) Politburo on grain procurements in Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus
- Nov. 5, 1932 - Resolution of CC CP(b)U on strengthening role of courts in grain procurement
- Nov. 6, 1932 - Telegram from the CC CP(b)U to the oblasts on economic blockade of raions not fulfilling grain procurement plans
- Nov. 18, 1932 - Resolution of the CC CP(b)U Politburo on measures to strengthen grain procurement (excerpt)
- Nov. 22, 1932 - Resolution of the CC AUCP(b) Politburo on establishing a death sentence commission in the Ukrainian SSR
- Nov. 25, 1932 - Resolution of CC AUCP(b) Politburo on silver purchases by Torgsin
- Dec. 3, 1932 - Telegram from USSR SNK Deputy Chairman to the Ukrainian SSR RNK and CC on the unconditional fulfillment of grain export plans
- Dec. 6, 1932 - Resolution of the Ukrainian SSR RNK and CC CP(b)U on blacklisting villages that maliciously sabotage grain procurements
- Dec. 6, 1932 - Telegram from Ukrainian SSR RNK and CC CP(b)U to the heads of Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa and Kharkiv oblasts on blacklisting villages
- Dec. 9, 1932 - Telegram from Chubar to Kuibishev on grain export plan performance
- Dec. 14, 1932 - Resolution of CC AUCP(b) and USSR SNK on grain procurements in Ukraine, the Northern Caucasus and the Western Oblast
- Dec. 15, 1932 - Resolution of the CC AUCP(b) and USSR SNK on ukrainization in the Far East Region, Kazakhstan, Central Asia, the Central Black Earth Oblast and other areas
- Dec. 19, 1932 - Resolution of CC AUCP(b) and SNK USSR on grain procurement in Ukraine
- Dec. 22, 1932 - Telegram from Kaganovich to Stalin on cancelling the CC CP(b)U resolution from November 18, 1932
- Dec. 24, 1932 - Letter from the CC CP(b)U on the mandatory shipment of all collective farm grain reserves, including sowing seed, to complete the grain procurement plan
- Dec.r 28, 1932 - Minutes of the Berdyansk raion executive committee meeting on repressive measures against “blacklisted” collective farms (excerpt)
- Dec. 29, 1932 - Resolution of CC CP(b)U Politburo strengthening repressions against private farmers who maliciously hoard grain
- Dec. 29, 1932 - Letter from CC CP(b)U to oblast and raion Party committees on collecting all available reserves for grain procurement
- Dec. 29, 1932 - Report from OGPU to Stalin on completion of the deportation of villagers from raions in Kuban
- Jan. 1, 1933 - Resolution of the CC AUCP(b) Politburo on grain procurement in Ukraine
- Jan. 1, 1933 - Resolution of Politburo CC AUCP(b) on repressions against villagers in Dnipropetrovsk oblast
- Jan. 4, 1933 - Resolution of Politburo CC AUCP(b) on repressions against villagers in Kharkiv oblast
- Jan. 4, 1933 - Report from the Voroshilov Party committee to the Donetsk oblast committee of the CP(b)U on blacklisting the kolhosp in Horodyshche for the systematic non-performance of January 22, 1933 - grain procurement plans (excerpt)
- Jan. 20, 1933 - Report of the Vice-Consul of Italy in Batumi to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy on the influx of refugees from Ukraine (excerpt)
- Jan. 22, 1933 - Report from Balitsky to the OGPU on the mass exodus of villagers from Ukraine
- Jan. 22, 1933 - Order from the USSR SNK and CC AUCP(b) on preventing the mass flight of starving villagers in search of food
- Jan. 23, 1933 - Resolution of the CC CP(b)U Politburo on executing the January 22 Order from the USSR SNK and CC AUCP(b)
- Jan. 24, 1933 - Resolution of the CC AUCP(b) Politburo strengthening the CP(b)U Central Committee and oblast organizations
- Jan. 29, 1933 - Summary from the Peoples’ Commissariat of Justice, Ukrainian SSR to the CC CP(b)U on the number of verdicts for the evasion of grain deliveries, sabotage and grain speculation (excerpt)
- Feb. 2, 1933 - Report from Yagoda to Stalin and Molotov on measures for preventing mass exodus of villagers from the Ukrainian SSR, Northern Caucasus and Belarusian SSR
- Feb. 26, 1933 - Complaint from Hanna Derevinskaya, Krasnopillya, to the Dnipropetrovsk city council about the requisition of food for grain procurement
- Feb. 1933 - Report from the GPU Ukrainian SSR on the mass exodus from Ukrainian villages and operational measures for combating flight
- Feb. to August, 1933 - Table on deaths and cannibalism due to famine in Havrysh, Sosonka and Yakushinetska villages, Vinnytsia oblast
- Mar. 10, 1933 - Resolution of the CC AUCP(b) Politburo on setting up a special GPU trio in the Ukrainian SSR*
- Mar. 11, 1933 - Report from Vinnytsia oblast GPU to the Ukrainian SSR GPU on the grave conditions with food supplies and population deaths
- Mar. 12, 1993 - Report from the Ukrainian SSR GPU on problems with food supplies and raions affected by famine in Ukraine (excerpt)
- Mar. 14, 1993 - Report from the Peoples’ Commissariat of Land to the CC CP(b)U on famine and death in Kyiv oblast
- Apr. 19, 1933 - Report from the Political Section, Donetsk oblast Land Department to the CP(b)U oblast committee on food hortages, deaths and cannibalism
- Apr. 26, 1933 - Resolution of the USSR SNK on food and fodder assistance to Ukraine
- May 31, 1933 - Report from the Consul of Italy in Kharkiv to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy on “Famine and the Ukrainian Situation” (excerpts)
- Jun. 3, 1933 - Report from the Peoples’ Commissariat of Healthcare to the CP(b)U on the state of public health in Kyiv oblast in connection with famine
- Jun. 14, 1933 - Summary of reports from MTS Political Sections in Kyiv oblast on famine, death and the anti-Soviet moods among collective farmers (excerpt)
- Jul. 10, 1933 - Report from the Consul of Italy in Kharkiv to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy on “Famine and Sanitary Conditions” (excerpt)
- Aug. 31, 1933 - Resolution of SNK USSR on resettlement to Kuban, Terek and Ukraine
- Sep. 11, 1933 - Resolution of CC CP(b)U Politburo on additional resettlement of Steppe raions (excerpt)
- Sep. 18, 1933 - Report from Otto Schiller, agricultural expert, Embassy of Germany in the USSR to the German Ministry of food and agriculture (excerpt)
- Oct. 2, 1933 - Letter from Kaganovich to Stalin on resettlements to areas of the Northern Caucasus and Ukraine depopulated by the Holodomor (excerpt)
- Dec. 9, 1933 - Resolution of the CC AUCP(b) Politburo on the resettlement of collective farmers within the Ukrainian SSR and from other oblasts of the USSR
- Dec. 29, 1933 - Report of the All-Union Resettlement Committee on resettling collective farmers to Ukraine (with table)
#1 Resolution of CC CP(b)U on grain procurement
January 3, 1932
The following telegram shall be sent to all city and raion committees and persons deputized by the Central Committee:
“In disregard of the decision of the Politburo of the CC AUCP(b) from December 29 declaring January to be the month of decisive battle for grain procurements, of the special allocation of 70 million karbovantsi in goods to stimulate grain procurement, 60 percent of which has been sent and is arriving in the raions, and of the dispatch of many workers led by Politburo members: the state of grain procurement in Ukraine remains extremely alarming.
“In disregard of the decision of the Politburo of the CC AUCP(b) from December 29 declaring January to be the month of decisive battle for grain procurements, of the special allocation of 70 million karbovantsi in goods to stimulate grain procurement, 60 percent of which has been sent and is arriving in the raions, and of the dispatch of many workers led by Politburo members: the state of grain procurement in Ukraine remains extremely alarming.
The continued decline of procurements in
the first five-day plan of January (down to 2 million 800 thousand
poods from 3 million 500 thousand poods in the last five-day plan of
December) indicates that raion organizations and local workers have not
understood or do not want to understand the utmost importance and
necessity of fulfilling the January procurement plan.
We consider the state of affairs with grain procurements to be a disgrace to the Ukrainian party organization and demand that everyone authorized by the Central Committee, all Party organizations and all Party members, immediately use all measures necessary to ensure that Ukraine fully and completely executes the decisions concerning grain adopted by the October Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik).
Secretary CC CP(b)U, Stroganov.”
We consider the state of affairs with grain procurements to be a disgrace to the Ukrainian party organization and demand that everyone authorized by the Central Committee, all Party organizations and all Party members, immediately use all measures necessary to ensure that Ukraine fully and completely executes the decisions concerning grain adopted by the October Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik).
Secretary CC CP(b)U, Stroganov.”
* The January 3, 1932 CC CP(b)U Politburo
meeting addressed the issue of grain procurements raised in a telegram
from Stalin and Molotov in this matter.
Source:
Source:
TsDAHO Ukrayiny, fond 1, list 6, file 235, sheets 4-5
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 p.) Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv, p.110.
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 p.) Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv, p.110.
<Index>
#2 Letter to Stalin from Komsomol member Pastushenko, Polonyste village, Baban raion, Vinnitsa oblast, on the requisition of grain and starving collective farmers (excerpt)
February 10, 1932*
Good day honorable secretary of the AUCP(b), Comrade Stalin!
I am writing you this letter from a
remote, out-of-the-way village in Ukraine. On a military map you will
find the village called Polonyste on the river Yatran in the Uman region
of Baban raion. Listen to this, Comrade Stalin! The village of 317
homesteads is collectivized a full one hundred percent. Do you think we
have Soviet rule here?
No, it’s not Soviet, but completely
bourgeois. Remember serfdom, six days of work for the master, and the
seventh was а Sunday, when you didn’t work because it was a holiday? In
the village cooperative, we work every day. There is nothing around the
homes but empty buildings, yet we still have to pay taxes from our
households for work done on the collective farm, and turn over our own
savings; if you sign for a loan of 40 karbovantsi at the collective farm
then [you must] pay it back from your homestead. It has been three
years since everything has been collectivized by the kolhosp, yet we
have to turn in grain procurements for land that we contributed to the
kolhosp. Don’t go to the kolhosp for bread, but yourself provide 45
poods from three-tenths of a field, pay 28 karbovantsi for a share in
the cooperative and pay a construction advance of 15 karbovantsi from
your home; all that is left from three years of food are only kopeks of
money — such is life.
Our village has fulfilled the [grain
procurement] plan by 65 percent. The kolhosp shipped out the last funt
of every sort of grain. There is nothing for the horses, only chopped
wheat sprinkled with molasses; 56 horses have died already. Everyday
three, four, six horses die of starvation; there is not a kernel left.
There were 500 pigs, 184 of which have already died, [the remainder] eat
sugar beet residue. There are only 60 cows, of which 46 will go for
meat, leaving 14 for the entire village for all of 1932. That’s
livestock breeding for you. Ours is a beet-growing and cattle-farming
region and there are predictions that all the livestock will die in two
months. People are beginning to die of famine, to swell and children ask
for “bread, bread.” Do no think, Dear Leader, that people have refused
to work… or [that there was] a bad harvest that nobody is considering.
Last year’s harvest was average and the population barely survived
because the plan was 38,000 poods. This year it’s 57,000 poods…
A brigade of 86 persons has spent three
months doing nothing [but] check under every house, day after day. Since
the campaign began, every house has been searched 60 times. They took
the last funt of vegetables from the kolhosp, [leaving] collective
farmers with two poods of potatoes per person; the remaining funts went
for procurement. There is no provision for spring sowing, not a funt of
seed, not a grain crop left: no potatoes, no beans, no legumes, no
lentils, no peas, no buckwheat, no cattle grass, no barley, no oats, no
soybeans — everything to the last funt. They have taken our beets and
pickled cabbage and are taking away our chickens. Villagers say the
secret slaughter of rabbits is taking place because there is nothing to
eat. Such is the state of affairs, Comrade Stalin. […]
Komsomolets, Branch secretary,
member of RKM bureau
Pastushenko
member of RKM bureau
Pastushenko
Personal response to address: Baban raion, Ukrainian SSR, Polonyste, Komsomol branch secretary. **
TsDAVO Ukrayiny, fond 1, list 8, file 117, sheets 473-474
Collectivization and famine in Ukraine.1929-1933. (Kyiv, 1992, 734 pp) Kolektyvizatsia i holod na Ukraini 1929-1933 pp. 414-416.
* On this date the letter was transferred from Stalin’s Secretariat to the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee (VUTsVK).
** Chaban raion officials confirmed cases of negligence, livestock reduction and famine; the village council head was dismissed and expelled from the party.
** Chaban raion officials confirmed cases of negligence, livestock reduction and famine; the village council head was dismissed and expelled from the party.
<Index>
#3 Report from German Consulate in Kharkiv to the Embassy of Germany in the USSR on the agricultural situation (excerpt)
March 12, 1932
The New Year has not brought improvements
anywhere; in fact, according to general impressions, the situation has
most likely grown worse, not better. Although the numbers of the
five-year plan are on the rise, they are skeptically viewed by the
population, which does not feel any favorable results at all; the
numbers mean little on their own, because the [numbers of the] plans
need to be reconciled with the respective states of affairs; only
absolute numbers instead of percentages will provide the true picture.
People should be resigned to the fact that an end to unprecedented
poverty is nowhere in sight, that the road to the better future promised
by the end of the second five-year plan is long and burdensome. The
government knows that it can demand suffering and sacrifice from the
people and is busy with new demands that will crush all hope for the
better into nothing.
The significant reduction of bread
rations has resulted in noticeable deterioration among the masses. The
number of those without access to bread cards has grown. The forceful
requisition of grain from the countryside has taken away villagers’
supplies, including their own grain and seed reserves. Villagers are
charged stiff penalties, such as forced labor for one to two years,
including Reichsgermans who are unable to supply grain according to
demands. In two villages, for example, not one of the 1,000 homesteads
has any cows, the collective farm livestock is comprised of only 40
half-starved head of cattle and 60 swine. The appeals that we are
constantly receiving show the Germans’ despair: [they want] to be
recognized as Reich Germans or to acquire [German] citizenship rights
and to get help for those that have been exiled. There is not enough
bread, villagers are forced to eat unacceptable ersatz [food] and ride
into town to buy bread or trade other items (clothes, etc.) for food. On
the markets, one kilogram of bread costs nearly 10 rubles. Villagers,
who are underfed at the collective farms and workers whose rations are
insufficient, are begging for food. Prices in the open markets and
cooperative stores are on the rise; the Torgsin outlets have inflated
prices. The flow of the Russian population to the Torgsin stores is
large; they are primarily purchasing flour since gold is a payment
instrument in addition to currency, payments are made using gold items:
rings, crosses and scrap pieces of gold. A local Torgsin store is
expected to collect two kilograms of gold every day.
The end of grain purchasing indicates that there is no grain left to be extracted from the population. However, because the same minimum volumes are expected as last year, the government will have collected greater reserves for the planned needs of the army and for the event of war. [...]
Signature
The end of grain purchasing indicates that there is no grain left to be extracted from the population. However, because the same minimum volumes are expected as last year, the government will have collected greater reserves for the planned needs of the army and for the event of war. [...]
Signature
Der ukrainische Hunger-Holocaust: Stalins
verschwiegner Völkermord 1932/33 an 7 Millionen ukrainischen Bauern im
Spiegel geheimgehaltener Akten d. dt. Auswärtigen Amtes; e.
Dokumentation; aus d. Beständen d. Polit. Archivs im Auswärtigen Amt,
Bonn / hrsg. u. eingeleitet von D. Zlepko. – Sonnenbühl: Wild, 1988. –
pp. 95-97. Translated from German to Ukrainian by M. Dubyk.
<Index>
#4 Summary of letters on grain procurements and famine from the Agitation and Mass Campaigns Department to CC CP(b)U
April 28, 1932
To: Secretary of the CC CP(b)U
Comrade [Stanislaw] Kosior
Comrade [Stanislaw] Kosior
Between January 1 and April 22, 115
letters were sent to the CC CP(b)U, including from the Secretariat of
comrade Stalin, concerning misinformation on grain procurements, forced
collectivization of livestock, and other issues.
The greatest number of letters was from the month of April: 64.
Some of these letters have been sent for verification to oblast and raion committees… in other cases comrades have been dispatched for on-site investigation.
The greatest number of letters was from the month of April: 64.
Some of these letters have been sent for verification to oblast and raion committees… in other cases comrades have been dispatched for on-site investigation.
The most typical statements from the
letters received in the month of April are provided in the summaries
which I am sending to you, attached.
Director, Agitmass department, Sirko
Attachment.
Summaries of letters sent to CC AUCP(b),
Comrade Stalin and CC CP(b)U
Summaries of letters sent to CC AUCP(b),
Comrade Stalin and CC CP(b)U
“Honorable comrade Stalin, is there a
Soviet governmental law stating villagers should go hungry? Because we,
collective farm workers, have not had a funt of bread in our kolhosp
since January 1, 1932. It’s not only [the village of] Horby, but also
Hlobin and Semeniv, where there is mass famine among the people. We are
kolhosp workers and have decided to ask: what will come next?
“The question arises: How can we build a
socialist peoples’ economy when we are condemned to starving to death,
as the harvest is still four months away? What did we die for on the
battlefronts? To go hungry, to see our children die in pangs of hunger?”
(Letter to Comrade Stalin — from Horby, Hlobyn raion, Kremenchuk oblast, from collective farmers — unsigned).
(Letter to Comrade Stalin — from Horby, Hlobyn raion, Kremenchuk oblast, from collective farmers — unsigned).
“Our collective farm workers do not have a
piece of bread and there are those who have nothing at all and are
swelling from famine. The horses on the kolhosps are dying, people take
them to eat, which is leading to widespread disease; sanitary conditions
are absent. The question arises: Why are there abundant supplies of
different inexpensive grains in Voronezh, Annovka, Moscow, Kuban,
Tbilisi and Crimea, but there are none in Ukraine?
“It’s currently impossible to implement genuine Leninist Party Bolshevik policies in the countryside. A whole slew of raions are burdened with financial obligations (mobilization of internal resources, loan payment fees… taxes and so on). The political mood among the peasants is unbearable and threatens the strength and unity of the rear guard in the event of war.”’
(Anonymous letter to CC AUCP(b) from Fastiv).
“It’s currently impossible to implement genuine Leninist Party Bolshevik policies in the countryside. A whole slew of raions are burdened with financial obligations (mobilization of internal resources, loan payment fees… taxes and so on). The political mood among the peasants is unbearable and threatens the strength and unity of the rear guard in the event of war.”’
(Anonymous letter to CC AUCP(b) from Fastiv).
“In Russia I saw a pood of grain for 10
karbovantsi, while in Ukraine [a pood costs] 80 karbovantsi and there is
none. Everyone is going to Russia. If a farmer had ten funts left, they
even took that away. Collective farm workers currently have a very bad
view of kolhosp building. When I worked in the kolhosp for a year on the
tractor and had 250 workdays, I received twelve poods of bread and
nothing more: How can I survive? I’m torn up, hungry and am not even
ashamed of writing you, because I am a young person, I am 19 years old.”
(Letter to comrade Stalin from Krivoshein, Rohoziv, Boryspil raion, Kyiv oblast).
(Letter to comrade Stalin from Krivoshein, Rohoziv, Boryspil raion, Kyiv oblast).
“Fifty percent of people have left my
village, 80 percent men. The village was serednyatske [middle class
peasant] with 650 homesteads. More than 200 horses, or 50 percent, have
died and continue to do so. People are eating horsemeat from the dead or
eat pig slop, because there is no bread or potatoes, if not completely,
then 95 percent gone.
“Your approach to the countryside… that grain should be taken away and that villagers be made to work like [factory] workers is also necessary, but forcing the starving to work does not make any sense.
“Today, if not three-quarters, then half of Ukraine is going to Russia and Belarus for food because it’s there.”
(Letter to comrade Stalin from V. L. Rozbarsky, Lanintsi village, Prylutsky raion).
“Your approach to the countryside… that grain should be taken away and that villagers be made to work like [factory] workers is also necessary, but forcing the starving to work does not make any sense.
“Today, if not three-quarters, then half of Ukraine is going to Russia and Belarus for food because it’s there.”
(Letter to comrade Stalin from V. L. Rozbarsky, Lanintsi village, Prylutsky raion).
“Open letter from villagers of Vinnitsa and part of Kyiv oblasts. Famine gas gripped all the raions in our region.
The peasantry is on the move and fleeing the villages to save themselves from famine. Every day, ten to twenty families die from famine in the villages, children run off and railway stations are overflowing with fleeing villagers. There are no horses or livestock left in the countryside. Famine is forcing starving peasants and collective farmers to leave everything and go into the world [in search of] food. In Shevchenko raion, an entire village was infected by glanders because they ate dead horses. There can be no talk about the completion of sowing, because the ratio of peasants left in our villages is low and all are being killed by famine. It should be noted that there is no political security in these oblasts and Poland could easily pull the peasants over to its side. The bourgeoisie has created a genuine famine here, part of the capitalist plan to set the entire peasant class against the Soviet government.”
The peasantry is on the move and fleeing the villages to save themselves from famine. Every day, ten to twenty families die from famine in the villages, children run off and railway stations are overflowing with fleeing villagers. There are no horses or livestock left in the countryside. Famine is forcing starving peasants and collective farmers to leave everything and go into the world [in search of] food. In Shevchenko raion, an entire village was infected by glanders because they ate dead horses. There can be no talk about the completion of sowing, because the ratio of peasants left in our villages is low and all are being killed by famine. It should be noted that there is no political security in these oblasts and Poland could easily pull the peasants over to its side. The bourgeoisie has created a genuine famine here, part of the capitalist plan to set the entire peasant class against the Soviet government.”
(Letter to Comrades Stalin, Kalinin and
Molotov from P. S. Krofan, AUCP(b) member since 1925, party ticket
number 1271632, city of Vinnitsa).
Agitation and mass campaign department,
CC CP(b)U
CC CP(b)U
TsDAHO Ukrayiny, fond 1, list 20, file 5254, sheets 1-16;
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv pp.151-160.
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv pp.151-160.
<Index>
#5 Report from Vinnitsa oblast GPU to the CP(b)U oblast committee on famine and death in Trostianets raion
May 8, 1932
The latest information signals that famine is on the rise in many villages of Trostianets raion causing swelling and death.
The relief measures by raion organizations of organizing public kitchens are insufficient.
The situation in Trostianets raion deserves the oblast Party organization’s particular attention because a large number of the starving are children.
The relief measures by raion organizations of organizing public kitchens are insufficient.
The situation in Trostianets raion deserves the oblast Party organization’s particular attention because a large number of the starving are children.
The following cases have been recorded in several villages in the raion:
In Trostianchik, 40 families are starving, all collective farmers, most poverty-stricken, among them 15 children lie swollen.
In Palanka, famine has engulfed 52 homesteads, 301 collective farm family members, 108 of which are completely swollen.
Famine caused the death of the daughter of collective farmer Feodosiya Matsyhon, aged 24.
Fifteen private farms are reported starving in this same village, seven swollen from famine.
Mykhailo Orhan has died.
In Trostianchik, 40 families are starving, all collective farmers, most poverty-stricken, among them 15 children lie swollen.
In Palanka, famine has engulfed 52 homesteads, 301 collective farm family members, 108 of which are completely swollen.
Famine caused the death of the daughter of collective farmer Feodosiya Matsyhon, aged 24.
Fifteen private farms are reported starving in this same village, seven swollen from famine.
Mykhailo Orhan has died.
In the village of Stratievka several families of collective and private farmers are reported to be starving.
In the village of Severynovka, 23 collective farm family members are starving, eating only [food] substitutes: milled acorn with horseradish scraps, and so on.
In the village of Severynovka, 23 collective farm family members are starving, eating only [food] substitutes: milled acorn with horseradish scraps, and so on.
Many incidents of famine among private farmers are reported in other villages.
Incomplete numbers show 950 to 1,000 people starving in the raion for whom public kitchens have been organized. However they can only be fed for a short time due to lack of food.
Incomplete numbers show 950 to 1,000 people starving in the raion for whom public kitchens have been organized. However they can only be fed for a short time due to lack of food.
Nineteen incidents of death from famine have been recorded in the raion.
Chief of oblast GPU state political administration Levatsky
Chief of SPO secret political section Osinin
Chief of SPO secret political section Osinin
DA Vinnitsa oblast, fond 136, list 3, file 10, sheet 54;
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv pp. 160-161.
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv pp. 160-161.
<Index>
#6 Letter from CC CP(b)U Deputy Richytsky on mass famine, death and cannibalism in Uman raion, Vinnytsia oblast
May 20, 1932
Among 13 villages visited, I consider
seven to be in grave condition, six to be well off. By “well off” I mean
those villages with isolated instances of deaths and where the number
of swollen does not exceed three to four dozen.
I would thus describe the grave villages:
I would thus describe the grave villages:
1. Kuzmina Hreblia – 45 deaths, four to
five deaths every day; 25 percent of the village swollen from
starvation: around 1,000 people (I consider this number to be
exaggerated). The Party organization is falling apart, some activists
are also dying and they are eating sugar beet pulp, weeds and dogs. More
than 200 children are in the nursery. There is no movement among them:
some sit, others recline, pale, weak and swollen.
2. Ryzhivka– Up to 80 deaths, 86 swollen families, mostly collective farm workers, but some private farmers as well.
3. Cherpovodi – 85 deaths, up to 250
swollen, 150 can no longer stand. Fifty percent of the children in the
nursery are sick. One brigade member died, but was not reported to be
swollen.
4. Horodnytsia – Up to 100 deaths, daily
death rate of eight to twelve people, 100 of 600 homesteads swollen from
starvation. There are reports that collective farm workers who usually
take their meals at the public kitchen are swelling from hunger. There
are ten pigs for the entire village. There are only two cows for 200
private homesteads and 18 cows for 450 collective farmers. The kolhosp
has a farm for 81 cows (cows acquired by the kolhosp) of which 48 are
under yoke. Six children are without parents.
5. Furmanka – 112 deaths (438 homesteads
in village). Some homesteads have died out completely. The rate of
swelling has diminished, but half the village is swollen from hunger.
Ninety poods of sowing seeds were eaten with permission from the raion
Party committee secretary. There are nine horses for 60 private farms
and 80 families have left the village.
6. Lopotukha – 100 deaths in 500 homesteads.
7. Maksymivka – 30 deaths. 70 collective
and 35 private farms are swollen. The number of people swollen from
starvation is 25 percent.
An act of cannibalism occurred in
Stepkivtsi where a collective farmer killed and ate his child. He was
taken to the hospital and died. His family tried to stop him and did not
take part in the cannibalism. This was the striking case that the CC
requested information about, but I consider the fact that some
homesteads have completely died off in the countryside to be more
striking. I saw one family fully condemned to death. One child was not
moving at all, the second was swollen from hunger but still able to
walk. The mother was also swollen and only spoke in whispers. (They take
their meals at the collective farm public kitchen). The father died
earlier. The doctor diagnosed their cases as hopeless. […]
With communist greetings, Richytsky*
TsDAHO Ukrayiny, fond 1, list 20, file 5258, pages 79-81.
* This letter was relegated to the archives shortly after being received by the CC CP(b)U.
<Index>
#7 Letter from Petrovsky to Molotov and Stalin on the grave food situation and famine in the Ukrainian SSR (excerpts)
June 10, 1932
During the sowing campaign in Pryluky,
Lokhvytsia, Varva, Chernukhy, Pyriatyn, and Mala Devitsa raions, I came
face-to-face, so to speak, with the village. That does not mean that we,
Ukrainian communists, did not know what was happening in our villages
(although we are still being accused of being detached from the
countryside). We knew there would be severe pressure and hell to pay
during state grain procurements. In my opinion, the CC CP(b)U is guilty
of not objecting to, but beginning to fulfill the state’s grain plan of
510 million poods for Ukraine, in the name of maintaining the pace of
building socialism and in light of the tense state of international
affairs. It was in this sense that I understood the necessity to execute
CC AUCP(b) directives on grain procurements, which we adopted for
mandatory implementation.
We knew beforehand that fulfilling state grain procurements in Ukraine would be difficult, but what I have seen in the countryside indicates that we have greatly overdone it, we tried too hard. I was in many raion villages and saw a considerable part of the countryside engulfed in famine. There aren’t many, but there are people swollen from starvation, mainly poor peasants and even middle class farmers. They’re eating food scraps from the bottom of the barrel, if any are available. During well-attended meetings in the villages, I am yelled at for nothing, old women cry and men sometimes do also. At times the criticism of the situation created goes very deep and wide: “Why did they create an artificial famine? After all, we had a harvest. Why did they take away the sowing seeds? That did not happen even under the old regime. Why should Ukrainians make treacherous journeys for bread to non-grain producing areas? Why isn’t grain being brought here?” And so on.
It’s difficult to provide explanations
under the circumstances. You obviously condemn those who have committed
excesses, but generally feel like a carp squirming on a frying pan. In
response to the desperate cry for relief [in the form of] sowing seeds
and grain for food I promised something with regard to sowing seeds, but
told the farmers to find seed in their own region. Concerning grain for
food relief I cannot promise anything, or very little. Mass theft is
occurring in the villages because of the famine, mainly for poultry:
they steal chickens, ducks, take potato scraps, and butcher calves and
cows during the night and eat them.
Right now, the men are sowing millet and
buckwheat. The days for sowing millet are ending, but not for buckwheat,
and the villagers are expecting it [buckwheat seed] from us. They have
always objected to oats because they consider the labor to be a lost
cause and because oats will not ripen or even grow into a good grass in
this region. There will be insufficient sowing in these raions compared
to last year’s area. There is still a month or a month and a half before
the new crop. This means that famine will intensify. Therefore, I am
asking you directly: Would it not be possible to send relief to the
Ukrainian countryside in the amount of two or, if worse comes to worst,
one and a half million poods of grain? If this assistance could be
provided, then the party would be supported by the poor peasants and
even the middle-class farmers against our class enemies, and
collectivization would be invigorated. Relief must also be provided
because starving peasants will begin removing unripe grain [from the
fields] and much of it will perish in vain. The situation among the
intelligentsia in the countryside is particularly grave.
[ . . . ]
Because of the general famine, as you
know, villagers have started flocking to the Dno station, Central Black
Earth oblast [in Russia], Belarus and the Northern Caucasus. In some
cases, two-thirds of all men have left their villages in search of food.
At the Dno station, grain is 30 to 40 rubles a pood, but here it is 100
to 140 per pood. Naturally, there is mayhem at the stations and on the
transport vehicles. Speculation [for profit] is also emerging. The
situation can no longer be tolerated. I had suggested promoting the idea
of organized trips for grain by the cooperative society and collective
farms but, two to three days ago, the Peoples’ Commissariat for Railways
[issued] what amounts to a [travel] ban on trips for grain. Tickets are
not being issued to villagers at all, or in very limited numbers.
Peasants have asked me: Why are trips for grain prohibited? This however
plays into the kulaks’ hands. Every such fact is used against the Party
and collective farms. In the last while, anti-kolhosp sentiment has
grown stronger. In some places people are leaving collective farms,
taking away horses and other property.
I wrote this letter in Pryluky. I did not
reach anybody in Kharkiv and am sending this letter to you without [the
knowledge of] Comrade Kosior and other Politburo members.* In closing, I
once again request that you consider all methods and resources
available to provide urgent food relief in the form of grain to the
Ukrainian countryside, and to supply buckwheat [seed] for sowing as
quickly as possible in order to make up for what has not been sown.
H[ryhori] Petrovsky
RGASPI, fond 82, list 2, file 139, sheets 162-165;
Commanders of the Great Famine: V. Molotov and L. Kaganovich, trips to Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus. 1932-1933. (Kyiv, 2001, 399 p.) Komandyry velykoho holodu: poyizdky V. Molotova i L. Kaganovicha v Ukrainu i na Pivnichnyi Kavkaz. 1932-1933, pp.212-215.
RGASPI, fond 82, list 2, file 139, sheets 162-165;
Commanders of the Great Famine: V. Molotov and L. Kaganovich, trips to Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus. 1932-1933. (Kyiv, 2001, 399 p.) Komandyry velykoho holodu: poyizdky V. Molotova i L. Kaganovicha v Ukrainu i na Pivnichnyi Kavkaz. 1932-1933, pp.212-215.
* This was part of the Ukrainian Soviet
leaders’ game: Kosior did not dare officially inform Stalin about the
situation in the republic, so Petrovsky and Chubar did so
semi-officially.
<Index>
#8 Letter from Chubar to Molotov and Stalin on agricultural affairs in Ukrainian SSR (excerpts)
June 10, 1932
[...] In two trips (with a small break) I
spent 15 days in the hardest-hit raions and villages of Kyiv and
Vinnytsia oblasts. I became familiar with the state of affairs in 13
raions of Kyiv oblast (visited four villages) and four raions of
Vinnytsia oblast (visited eight villages). I should say that I was
unable to collect and check statistics for every raion and village to
the same extent. Nevertheless, the main facts in all these raions and
villages are similar enough that some general conclusions can be made.
What, in fact, has happened to those raions that emerged extraordinarily
weakened in the spring (some villages destroyed, in the direct sense)?
The failed harvest of legumes and spring
crops in those raions was most likely not considered and the crop
shortage was compensated by industrial crops earmarked for state
procurement. Along with the general weakness of the state grain
procurement plan, caused primarily by lower harvests across Ukraine and
colossal losses during harvesting (the result of organizationally- and
economically-weak collective farms and utterly inadequate control by the
raions and center), a system of requisitioning of all grain, including
seed reserves, from private farmers was introduced and everything of
value was requisitioned from collective farms. Even if collective farms
met the targets set by the procurement plan targets, they were issued an
additional second and often third [grain quota target]. In many cases,
grain issued to collective farmers as advance payment for work was
confiscated by [collectivization] brigades for state grain procurement.
As a result, the majority of collective farms in those raions were left
without grain, without animal feed concentrate for livestock, without
food for the disabled, for teachers, etc. […]
The collective farmers with fewest
workdays suffered the most, although initially it seemed only private
farmers were deprived of grain. In March and April, there were tens and
hundreds of malnourished, starving and swollen people dying from famine
in every village; children abandoned by their parents and orphans
appeared. Raions and oblasts provided food relief from internal
reserves, but growing despair and the psychology of famine resulted in
more appeals for help. Under these circumstances the collective farms,
Soviet state farms and raions should have launched a broad network of
public kitchens to deal with the acute shortage of food products in
general, and grain in particular.
Cases of malnutrition and starvation were
noted in December and January, both among private farmers (particularly
whose farms and belongings were sold for failing to meet grain targets)
and among collective farmers, especially those with large families. […]
A few words about the excesses of those
in charge of economic campaigns and the violations of revolutionary
lawfulness that took place in these raions, and, unquestionably,
impacted their economic conditions. They were primarily the following:
1) Orders for sowing were received by the
raions that contravened crop rotation [practices]; the raions, in turn,
assigned absurd tasks to the kolhosps, ignoring the views and
experience of collective farmers and [the rules of] agronomy. They were
forced to sow winter crops on stubble-fields, which predictably reduced
crop capacity, and so on. As a result in Baban raion, for example, with a
capacity of 150 to 200 poods of wheat per hectare, they collected only
60 to 70.
2) Raions were overloaded with work,
which disrupted fall sowing and winter plowing. The deep tilling of land
for sugar beets led to a drop in crop yields and loss of interest among
collective farms. Very few collective farms in these raions had fully
prepared their fields for beets by the fall; as a result, [only] 30 to
50 percent was prepared.
3) In the battle for bread, the right to
sell the property of malicious non-deliverers of grain (the law of 1929)
was abused. Private farmers’ harvests were gathered and threshed on
so-called “red threshing floors” with threshed grain delivered to grain
collectors. This was followed up by rigid “home” targets which were left
unfulfilled and resulted in the forced sale of all property, including
buildings, domestic goods and chattel, footwear, clothing, etc. In some
villages, 20 percent or more of farms have been sold. Add to this the
malicious humiliation of private farmers, the majority of who would have
become collective farmers, and that of expelled collective farmers,
then it becomes clear why independent farmers have no working animals,
land allotments or livestock. Those whose livestock was not sold by way
of repressions sold or butchered [their livestock] themselves.
Leaderless brigades were on the rampage. Those guilty of excesses were
tried, but you cannot try all their deeds with one trial.
In addition to grain procurements, the
same methods were applied to potato and, especially, meat procurements. A
question arises: Is it not time to abolish the system of sales in
fully-collectivized raions (since the tools and means of production have
been sold off)?
After such actions, it’s clear why so few
village council heads and leading [Party] activists from the previous
campaigns are left in local areas. Some were tried and removed, while
others ran off on their own. Few raion leaders have survived. The new
people have lost their heads under the colossal pressure from a public
demanding food and the return of illegally-sold property and
improperly-collectivized livestock…
[…] The proper functioning of agriculture
has been impaired in the Ukrainian SSR over such a large area that
special corrections are required to state grain and meat procurement
targets and other agricultural goals; in this regard it will be
necessary to address the Central Committee and the Council of Peoples’
Commissars separately.
V. Chubar
RGASPI, fond 82, list 2, file 139, sheets 144-153.
Commanders of the Great Famine: V.
Molotov and L. Kaganovich, trips to Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus.
1932-1933. (Kyiv, 2001, 399 p.) Komandyry velykoho holodu: poyizdky V.
Molotova i L. Kaganovicha v Ukrainu i na Pivnichnyi Kavkaz. 1932-1933.
p. 206-212.
<Index>
#9 Letter from Kaganovich to Stalin on appeals from Ukrainian SSR leaders to CC AUCP(b) (excerpt)
June 12, 1932
...5) I am sending you letters from
Chubar and Petrovsky.* Chubar’s letter is more businesslike and
self-critical and does not contain the same rot found in Petrovsky’s
letter. In his very first lines Petrovsky unloads all blame on the CC
AUCP(b) by saying that he “understood the necessity to execute CC
AUCP(b) directives on grain procurements” as if they were unable to
raise all their issues with the CC AUCP(b) in a timely and honest
fashion. He (Petrovsky) is engaged in polemics with those who are
speaking the truth: they were out of touch with the countryside and did
not know the state of affairs. Otherwise he should admit to hiding the
truth from the CC AUCP(b). They only began speaking when the CC from
Moscow pointed out their flagrant disgraces. His letter amounts to:
first, the preparation of grounds for rejecting grain procurement
[quotas] this year, which is absolutely unacceptable and, second, both
he and Chubar are requesting grain for food relief. In this [latter]
matter, we will have to provide help, but the question is one of scale.
Can you please provide your thoughts on the matter? Kosior is not
writing anything.
RGASPI, fond 558, list 11, file 740, sheet 41;
Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931-1936 (Moscow, 2001, 798 pp) Stalin i Kaganovich. Perepyska. 1931-1936 p.164.
Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931-1936 (Moscow, 2001, 798 pp) Stalin i Kaganovich. Perepyska. 1931-1936 p.164.
* On June 10, 1932, Chubar and Petrovsky
sent letters to the CC AUCP(b) concerning the grave conditions in
agriculture, famine and the need for food relief in the Ukrainian SSR.
See Documents 7 and 8.
<Index>
#10 Letter from Stalin to Kaganovich on Appeal from Ukrainian SSR leaders to CC AUCP(b) (excerpt)
June 15, 1932
...4) I did not like the letters from
Chubar and Petrovsky.* The former spouts “self-criticism” in order to
secure millions more poods of bread from Moscow, the latter is feigning
sainthood, claiming victimization from the “CC AUCP directive” in order
to reduce grain procurement levels. Neither one nor the other is
acceptable. Chubar is mistaken if he thinks that self-criticism is
required for securing outside “help” and not for mobilizing the forces
and resources within Ukraine. In my opinion Ukraine has been given more
than enough. Yet give them grain for nothing and from nowhere. The worst
in this case is Kosior’s silence. How is this silence explained? Does
he know about the Chubar-Petrovsky letters?
Regards! J. Stalin.
RGASPI, fond 81, list 3, file 99, page 63;
Tragedy of the Soviet countryside. Collectivization and dekulakization, documents and materials in five volumes. Vol. 3. (Мoscow, 2001, 1007 pp) Tragedia sovietskoi derevni. Kolektyvizatsia i raskulachivanie. Dokumenty i materialy: v 5 tomakh p. 169.
Tragedy of the Soviet countryside. Collectivization and dekulakization, documents and materials in five volumes. Vol. 3. (Мoscow, 2001, 1007 pp) Tragedia sovietskoi derevni. Kolektyvizatsia i raskulachivanie. Dokumenty i materialy: v 5 tomakh p. 169.
------------------------------------------------------------
* See Petrovsky and Chubar’s June 10, 1932 letters (Documents 7 and 8).
------------------------------------------------------------
* See Petrovsky and Chubar’s June 10, 1932 letters (Documents 7 and 8).
------------------------------------------------------------
<Index>
#11 Letter from Kaganovich to Stalin on grain procurement preparations in the Ukrainian SSR (excerpt)
June 16, 1932
...4) As a result of the harvest campaign
commission’s work* we have thus far passed one part of the resolutions
for the material support of the harvest campaign; a CC or CC and SNK
resolution on organizing the harvest campaign is currently being
drafted. Because that document will be very important we will send it to
you before it is adopted. This year’s harvest campaign will be
especially difficult, particularly in Ukraine. Unfortunately, Ukraine is
not sufficiently preparing for it, and we face the danger of premature,
spontaneous and unorganized harvesting and plundering of grain from the
fields. We have spoken to Chubar who is not the problem; it is the
timely mobilization of the entire organization, but Kosior maintains
silence.
RGASPI, fond 558, list 11, file 740, page 61;
Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931-1936 (Moscow, 2001, 798 pp) Stalin i Kaganovich. Perepyska. 1931-1936 p.173.
Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931-1936 (Moscow, 2001, 798 pp) Stalin i Kaganovich. Perepyska. 1931-1936 p.173.
* The commission headed by Molotov was
created by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union
Communist Party (bolsheviks) on June 7, 1932
<Index>
#12 Letter from Stalin to Kaganovich and Molotov on the Ukrainian SSR leadership
July 2, 1932
To Kaganovich. To Molotov.
1) Pay more serious attention to Ukraine.
Chubar’s deterioration and opportunistic nature, Kosior’s rotten
diplomacy (in relation to the CC AUCP) and a criminally-reckless
approach to affairs will lose Ukraine in the end. Running Ukraine today
is not for our comrades’ shoulders. If you attend the Ukrainian
conference (I insist), use all measures to win over workers’ sentiment,
isolate whining and rotten diplomats (regardless of personas!) and
ensure a truly-Bolshevik decision [is made] by the conference. I have a
feeling (even a conviction), that we will have to remove both Chubar and
Kosior from Ukraine. Perhaps I am mistaken. You will have an
opportunity to check the matter at the conference.*
2) In am sending back a draft of the CC greeting on occasion of the Clara Zetkin anniversary.**
The draft’s tone was a little too rapturous and pseudo-classical. I toned it down with my corrections.
Regards! J. Stalin
The draft’s tone was a little too rapturous and pseudo-classical. I toned it down with my corrections.
Regards! J. Stalin
RGASPI, fond 558, list 11, file 740, sheet 41;
Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931-1936 (Moscow, 2001, 798 pp) Stalin i Kaganovich. Perepyska. 1931-1936 p.164.
Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931-1936 (Moscow, 2001, 798 pp) Stalin i Kaganovich. Perepyska. 1931-1936 p.164.
* On July 3, 1932 the Politburo CC
AUCP(b) passed a resolution "On the Ukrainian party conference" ordering
Kaganovich and Molotov to take part in the Third All-Ukrainian
conference of the CP(b)U.
** German communist Clara Eissner Zetkin
was born on July 5, 1857. She died near Moscow less than a year after
this letter on June 20, 1933. In 1911, Zetkin initiated “International
Women’s Day” which is celebrated to this day every March 8.
<Index>
#13 Letter from Molotov and Kaganovich to Stalin on the Ukrainian Party conference and grain procurement plan
July 6, 1932
To Comrade Stalin
Today, we discussed the draft of the
resolution and the conference with the CC CP(b)U Politburo. We said the
resolution was unacceptable in its weak criticism of CC CP(b)U leaders
for affairs in the countryside, in failing to provide concrete tasks for
fulfilling the grain procurement plan and doing battle with
demobilizing sentiments in this matter. All Politburo members, including
Skrypnyk,* spoke for reducing the plan, pointing out that 2.2 million
hectares have been under-sowed and 0.8 million hectares of winter crop
have been lost.
We categorically rejected a revision of the plan, demanded the mobilization of Party forces to combat losses and the squander of grain and to invigorate collective farms. In contrast to his statement during the Politburo [meeting], Kosior defended the position of plan fulfillment during his speech at the conference. We think that the resolution should express dissatisfaction of the CC CP(b)U for affairs in the countryside in the last while. Please provide your thoughts. **
We categorically rejected a revision of the plan, demanded the mobilization of Party forces to combat losses and the squander of grain and to invigorate collective farms. In contrast to his statement during the Politburo [meeting], Kosior defended the position of plan fulfillment during his speech at the conference. We think that the resolution should express dissatisfaction of the CC CP(b)U for affairs in the countryside in the last while. Please provide your thoughts. **
Molotov, Kaganovich
6.VII.32 Kharkiv.
6.VII.32 Kharkiv.
RGASPI, fond 558, list 11, file 78, sheet 16;
Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931-1936 (Moscow, 2001, 798 pp) Stalin i Kaganovich. Perepyska. 1931-1936 p.219.
Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931-1936 (Moscow, 2001, 798 pp) Stalin i Kaganovich. Perepyska. 1931-1936 p.219.
* Mykola Skrypnyk (1872-1933) was the
Ukrainian SSR’s Peoples’ Commissar of Education and a member of the
Politburo of the CC CP(b)U. He was publicly discredited and purged for
conducting policies of ukrainization and died of an allegedly
self-inflicted gunshot wound in July, 1933.
** The following day Stalin agreed to expressing dissatisfaction with the work of CC CP(b)U leaders.
<Index>
#14 Resolution of the CC CP(b)U Politburo on grain procurement target*
July 6, 1932
To recognize as correct the 356 million
pood plan established by the CC AUCP(b) for grain procurement in the
[Ukrainian SSR’s] rural sector and accept it for unconditional
fulfillment.
TsDAHO Ukrayiny, fond 1, list 6, file 236, page 85;
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv p. 194.
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv p. 194.
* The meeting was attended by Molotov and Kaganovich, dispatched by Stalin to enforce the all-Union Communist Party directive.
<Index>
#15 Telegram from Molotov and Kaganovich to Stalin on covering-up the real state of affairs in the Ukrainian SSR
July 6, 1932
To Comrade Stalin
Criticism of the CC CP(b)U’s work should
emerge during the Ukrainian conference for shortcomings that have
resulted in grave conditions in several raions. The question arises of
raising this issue in the press. In order to avoid feeding the foreign
press, we feel it necessary to maintain a reserved tone in our
exposition of that criticism without publicizing the facts about the
state of affairs in the bad raions. Please provide your thoughts to
Kharkiv.*
Molotov, Kaganovich
Skuratov Station, Kursk Railways,
6.VII.1932. 8 hrs, 38 mins.
Skuratov Station, Kursk Railways,
6.VII.1932. 8 hrs, 38 mins.
RGASPI, fond 558, list 11, file 78, page 12;
Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931-1936 (Moscow, 2001, 798 pp) Stalin i Kaganovich. Perepyska. 1931-1936 p. 218-219.
Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931-1936 (Moscow, 2001, 798 pp) Stalin i Kaganovich. Perepyska. 1931-1936 p. 218-219.
* On July 6, 1932 Stalin agreed to the proposed cover-up measures.
<Index>
#16 Letter from Belarusian workers to the CC CP(b)U on starving Ukrainians in their republic
July 15, 1932
When has Belarus ever fed Ukraine? There
were bad years, but Ukraine always fed Belarus; now it’s the other way
around. Belarus is not against helping Ukrainian collective farms and
worker-peasants in an organized manner, [but] not the way it’s happening
right now: in Belarus [we] cannot go anywhere, travel on the railways
and roads because of the Ukrainians. Starving and destitute Ukrainians
are everywhere, lying on the streets of Belarusian towns: Zhlobin,
Homiel, Bakhmuch, Bykhaw, Mahimt, Orsha, Minsk, Sirotsino. Some live in
the woods…
Many Ukrainians are looking for bread near the very border of bourgeois feudal Poland and people are saying that [the government] wants to starve Ukrainians to death, while the newspapers write that everything’s fine. Why don’t they write the truth: millions are starving and grain is rotting in the fields, many of which have been overgrown with grass and left untilled, because able men and women have run off into the world for a piece of bread, to avoid dying from famine.
And it’s a real pity to see the starving Ukrainians and when you ask them: “Why don’t you work at home?” they answer that there is no seed, there’s nothing to do in collective farms and provisions are bad. But fact remains fact: millions of people are wandering naked, starving in the forests, stations, towns and collective farms of Belarus, and begging for a piece of bread. How is the bread problem being solved in Ukraine? Where is the Ukrainian party’s Central and Central Executive Committees? What are the measures? Our hearts hurt for this dismal state of affairs.
Many Ukrainians are looking for bread near the very border of bourgeois feudal Poland and people are saying that [the government] wants to starve Ukrainians to death, while the newspapers write that everything’s fine. Why don’t they write the truth: millions are starving and grain is rotting in the fields, many of which have been overgrown with grass and left untilled, because able men and women have run off into the world for a piece of bread, to avoid dying from famine.
And it’s a real pity to see the starving Ukrainians and when you ask them: “Why don’t you work at home?” they answer that there is no seed, there’s nothing to do in collective farms and provisions are bad. But fact remains fact: millions of people are wandering naked, starving in the forests, stations, towns and collective farms of Belarus, and begging for a piece of bread. How is the bread problem being solved in Ukraine? Where is the Ukrainian party’s Central and Central Executive Committees? What are the measures? Our hearts hurt for this dismal state of affairs.
Belarus - workers
Petro, Savin, Kuduk
Petro, Savin, Kuduk
TsDAHO Ukrayiny, fond 1, list 20, file 5255, sheets 68-69;
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv p.209.
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv p.209.
<Index>
#17 Letter from Stalin to Kaganovich and Molotov on CC CP(b)U leadership (excerpt)
No later than July 15, 1932
...2) Concerning Ukraine… Kosior can only
be preplaced by Kaganovich. No other candidates in sight. Mikoyan* is
unsuitable: not only for Ukraine, he is not even fit to be Peoples’
Commissar for Provisions (limbless and unorganized “agitator”). But we
cannot send Kaganovich to Ukraine (impractical!): we’ll weaken the
[All-Union] Central Committee secretariat. We’ll have to wait some time.
Concerning Chubar: he can stay for now and we’ll see how he works out.
* Anastas Mikoyan (1895-1978) was the USSR Narkomsnab Peoples’ Commissar for Provisions and External Trade (1930-1933).
RGASPI, fond 81, list 3, file 99, sheet 171;
Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931-1936 (Moscow, 2001, 798 pp) Stalin i Kaganovich. Perepyska. 1931-1936 p.225.
RGASPI, fond 81, list 3, file 99, sheet 171;
Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931-1936 (Moscow, 2001, 798 pp) Stalin i Kaganovich. Perepyska. 1931-1936 p.225.
<Index>
#18 Report from Vinnytsia oblast Prosecutor to the Ukrainian SSR Prosecutor on cannibalism in Nove Misto
Before July 17, 1932
I hereby report, that in the last days of
June, in the village of Nove Misto, Monastyryshche raion, Citizen
Havryliuk, aged 36, and his wife, weak middle-class farmers in terms of
their property status, butchered and ate their children, boys aged 9 and
2.
His wife is currently unconscious and unable to speak. From the butchered children one head was found, chopped at the neck and buried in the earth. Several ribs were also found.
The investigation into this case is ongoing. It has been proposed to the local prosecutor that the investigation include holding village leaders responsible for [their] inconsiderate behavior towards the Havryliuk family.
His wife is currently unconscious and unable to speak. From the butchered children one head was found, chopped at the neck and buried in the earth. Several ribs were also found.
The investigation into this case is ongoing. It has been proposed to the local prosecutor that the investigation include holding village leaders responsible for [their] inconsiderate behavior towards the Havryliuk family.
Oblast prosecutor Chernin
TsDAHO Ukrayiny, fond 1, list 20, file 5488, sheet 49;
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv pp.210-211
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv pp.210-211
<Index>
#19 Resolution “On safekeeping property of state enterprises, collective farms and cooperatives and strengthening public (socialist) property" (excerpt)*
August 7, 1932
II
1) Make all property belonging to collective farms and cooperatives (harvests in the fields, public reserves, livestock, cooperative stock and stores, etc.) equivalent to state property and fully strengthen the protection of this property against theft.
2) Use judicial repressions of the highest degree as measures of social protection against theft of kolhosp and collective property: execution by shooting and confiscation of all property, variable under mitigating circumstances to ten years imprisonment with confiscation of all property.
3) Amnesty cannot be granted to criminals sentenced in cases of collective farm and cooperative property theft.
1) Make all property belonging to collective farms and cooperatives (harvests in the fields, public reserves, livestock, cooperative stock and stores, etc.) equivalent to state property and fully strengthen the protection of this property against theft.
2) Use judicial repressions of the highest degree as measures of social protection against theft of kolhosp and collective property: execution by shooting and confiscation of all property, variable under mitigating circumstances to ten years imprisonment with confiscation of all property.
3) Amnesty cannot be granted to criminals sentenced in cases of collective farm and cooperative property theft.
III
1) Conduct decisive battle with all anti-public, kulak-capitalist elements that use violence and threats, or promote the use of violence and threats, against collective farmers, forcing them to leave or purposefully destroy collective farms.
2) Use measures of judicial repressions for protecting collective farms and collective farmers from violence and threats on the part of kulak and other anti-public elements: imprisonment for five to ten years in a concentration camp.
3) Amnesty cannot be granted to criminals sentenced in these cases.
1) Conduct decisive battle with all anti-public, kulak-capitalist elements that use violence and threats, or promote the use of violence and threats, against collective farmers, forcing them to leave or purposefully destroy collective farms.
2) Use measures of judicial repressions for protecting collective farms and collective farmers from violence and threats on the part of kulak and other anti-public elements: imprisonment for five to ten years in a concentration camp.
3) Amnesty cannot be granted to criminals sentenced in these cases.
Head, USSR Central Executive Committee, M. Kalinin
Head, Council of Peoples’ Commissars, V. Molotov (Skryabin)
Secretary, USSR Central Executive Committee, А. Yenukidze
Head, Council of Peoples’ Commissars, V. Molotov (Skryabin)
Secretary, USSR Central Executive Committee, А. Yenukidze
Communist newspaper, August 9, 1932;
“Collectivization of agriculture: the most important resolutions of the
Communist Party and Soviet government, 1927-1935,” Moscow, 1957, pp.
423-424.
* This law made collective farm property
equal to state property and provided extremely severe punitive measures
for encroaching on the harvest. In popular lore, this resolution became
known as “the law of five ears of wheat.” Stalin would later invoke the
law in a January All-Union Politburo resolution (see Document 44).
<Index>
#20 Letter from Stalin to Kaganovich on changing Ukrainian SSR leadership (excerpt)
August 11, 1932
…3) The main issue is now Ukraine.
Matters in Ukraine are currently extremely bad. Bad from the standpoint
of the Party line. They say that in two oblasts of Ukraine (Kyiv and
Dnipropetrovsk, I believe), nearly 50 raion Party committees have spoken
out against the grain procurement plan as unrealistic. They say the
matter is no better in other raion committees. What does this look like?
This is not a Party, but a parliament, a caricature of a parliament.
Instead of directing the raions, Kosior is always waffling between CC
AUCP directives and the demands of raion committees, and he’s waffled
himself to the end. Lenin was right when he said that a person who lacks
the courage to go against the flow at the right moment cannot be a real
Bolshevik leader. Bad from the standpoint of the Soviet line. Chubar is
no leader. Bad from the standpoint of the GPU. [Stanislaw] Redens is
incapable of leading the battle with counterrevolution in such a large
and unique republic as Ukraine.
If we do not correct the situation in Ukraine immediately, we will lose Ukraine.
Also keep in mind that within the
Ukrainian Communist Party (500,000 members, ha, ha) there is no lack
(yes, no lack!) of rotten elements, active and latent petlurites and
direct agents of Pilsudski. If the situation gets any worse, these
elements won't hesitate to open a front within (and outside) the Party,
against the Party. Worst of all, the Ukrainian leadership does not see
these dangers.
Things should not continue this way any longer.
It is necessary:
It is necessary:
a) to remove Kosior from Ukraine and replace him with you [Kaganovich]; you will retain the post of secretary of the CC AUCP(b);
b) after this, transfer Balitsky to
Ukraine as chairman of the Ukrainian GPU (or PP [authorized
representative] to Ukraine, as it seems the GPU chairman position in
Ukraine does not exist) and he will remain deputy chairman of the
[All-Union] OGPU; make Redens a deputy to Balitsky in Ukraine;*
c) in a few months replace Chubar with
another comrade, say, Hrynko or anybody else, and appoint Chubar to be
Molotov’s deputy in Moscow (Kosior can be made one of the secretaries of
the CC AUCP(b));**
d) Set yourself the goal of turning
Ukraine into a fortress of the USSR, a real model republic, within the
shortest possible time. Don't spare money for this purpose.
Without these and similar measures
(economic and political strengthening of Ukraine starting with the
raions along the border, etc.), I repeat once again: we will lose
Ukraine.
What do you think on this matter?
This requires attention as soon as possible, immediately after [your] arrival in Moscow.
Regards!
J. Stalin
11.VIII.32
Р. S. I have spoken to Menzhinsky about Balitsky and Redens. He agrees and fully supports the changes.***
J. Stalin
11.VIII.32
Р. S. I have spoken to Menzhinsky about Balitsky and Redens. He agrees and fully supports the changes.***
RGASPI, fond 81, list 3, file 99, sheets 146-151;
Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931-1936 (Moscow, 2001, 798 pp) Stalin i Kaganovich. Perepyska. 1931-1936 pp.273-274.
Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931-1936 (Moscow, 2001, 798 pp) Stalin i Kaganovich. Perepyska. 1931-1936 pp.273-274.
* Vsevold Balitsky (1892-1937) was
dispatched to the Ukrainian SSR by CC AUCP(b) Politburo resolution “On a
Special OGPU Commissioner for Ukraine” from November 24, 1932. Balitsky
was the deputy head of the OGPU joint state political administration,
SNK USSR (1931-1934). He headed the GPU political police in Ukraine
(1933-1937) and was a member of the Central Oversight Commission of the
All-Union Party. Stanislaw Redens (1892-1938) was a member of the
Central Committee of the All-Union party (1927-1934) and the head of the
Ukrainian SSR republican GPU (1931-1933). He was replaced by Balitsky
as head of the Ukrainian GPU in February 1933.
** Hryhori Hrynko (1890-1938) was the SNK USSR Peoples’ Commissar for Finance (1930-1937).
*** Vyacheslav Menzhinsky (1874-1934) was the head of the SNK USSR OGPU (1926-1934).
<Index>
#21 Letter from Kaganovich to Stalin on personnel changes in the Ukrainian SSR
August 16, 1932
...4) Regarding Ukrainian affairs:
a) I fully and completely agree with your opinion on the state of affairs in Ukraine. The problem is that, among the leadership, the matter of grain procurement, their talk of the impossibility of carrying out the plan has developed into an issue of attitudes towards Party policies. The lack of confidence and perspective, confusion and the formal performance of “duty” – these are the main elements of the bacteria eating away at some of the [Party] activists and affecting the top “a bit” (slightly). The theory that we, Ukrainians, have innocently suffered, is creating solidarity …among not only the middle leadership, but at the top as well. I think that regardless of the organizational conclusions, the time has come for the CC AUCP(b) to officially, in a political document, assess the state of affairs and call for the organization of a decisive breakthrough. They are not taking their own conference resolution seriously, considering it to be forced to some extent.
a) I fully and completely agree with your opinion on the state of affairs in Ukraine. The problem is that, among the leadership, the matter of grain procurement, their talk of the impossibility of carrying out the plan has developed into an issue of attitudes towards Party policies. The lack of confidence and perspective, confusion and the formal performance of “duty” – these are the main elements of the bacteria eating away at some of the [Party] activists and affecting the top “a bit” (slightly). The theory that we, Ukrainians, have innocently suffered, is creating solidarity …among not only the middle leadership, but at the top as well. I think that regardless of the organizational conclusions, the time has come for the CC AUCP(b) to officially, in a political document, assess the state of affairs and call for the organization of a decisive breakthrough. They are not taking their own conference resolution seriously, considering it to be forced to some extent.
An official political resolution from the
CC will quickly fix the majority of the [Party] activists and will make
it easier to fix the general state of affairs in Ukraine.
You are also correct in connecting the
issue to the international situation, to Pilsudski’s efforts; there is a
grave danger within Party organizations and the weakness of the ideal
of battling with putridity and lack of principles. It was pitiful to
look at the Ukrainian activists while at their conference.
b) Concerning the issue of replacing
Kosior, I agree that he has shown significant weaknesses and
shortcomings. As the head of the largest organization in the party, he
made matters easy for its leaders. Can he be corrected? It’s more
difficult for me to say than for you. Perhaps it’s worthwhile to take
him by the […]*, crack a few ribs to teach him a lesson; however, the
situation in Ukraine is so difficult that there is little time for
teaching.
c) Regarding my personal issues, I can state the following:
With my vast experience in managing and placing cadres and after analyzing the situation, I realize that there is obviously no other way out. It will naturally be easier for me to take to the task directly because I know the country, economy and the people. Truth be told, the people are not the same; I previously knew them to be different; they have gradually changed for the worse, in other words, changed considerably as a result of “softness” and lightness of management according to the principles of “do not offend” or mutual amnesty. This, by the way, is one of the factors that kill the mood – to have to start from the very beginning with the people in the same Ukraine! However, Comrade Stalin, you have put the question so broadly and clearly from the standpoint of the Party’s interests that there can be no serious hesitation. After all, you have not only the official political right, but also the moral right of a comrade, to do as you see fit with the person You [sic] have formed as a political figure, meaning me, Your student.
With my vast experience in managing and placing cadres and after analyzing the situation, I realize that there is obviously no other way out. It will naturally be easier for me to take to the task directly because I know the country, economy and the people. Truth be told, the people are not the same; I previously knew them to be different; they have gradually changed for the worse, in other words, changed considerably as a result of “softness” and lightness of management according to the principles of “do not offend” or mutual amnesty. This, by the way, is one of the factors that kill the mood – to have to start from the very beginning with the people in the same Ukraine! However, Comrade Stalin, you have put the question so broadly and clearly from the standpoint of the Party’s interests that there can be no serious hesitation. After all, you have not only the official political right, but also the moral right of a comrade, to do as you see fit with the person You [sic] have formed as a political figure, meaning me, Your student.
d) I agree with you concerning the other
proposals, the issue is only one of timeframes, but I intend to speak to
you in person (about [Hryhori] Hrynko and [Vlas] Chubar). I currently
feel so physically exhausted (terrible headaches) that, without rest and
treatment, it will be difficult for me to take on a new major burden.
e) I am also worried about Moscow, i.e.
who might be put in [my] place because so much work has already been
done, but we will talk about this in person.
f) We will also have to think about other workers, fresh blood (at least some) for Ukraine...
RGASPI, fond 558, list 11, file 740, sheets 155-159;
Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931-1936 (Moscow, 2001, 798 pp) Stalin i Kaganovich. Perepyska. 1931-1936 pp.283-284.
Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931-1936 (Moscow, 2001, 798 pp) Stalin i Kaganovich. Perepyska. 1931-1936 pp.283-284.
* Illegible word.
<Index>
#22 Telegram from Deputy USSR SNK Chairman ordering faster grain exports from Ukraine
August 27, 1932
Instead of the established government
plan of shipping 190,000 tonnes from the ports during August, you have
only shipped 20,000. This situation is leading to significant losses of
currency due to unfulfilled contracts, storage of tonnage and also [our]
reputation on the markets. I suggest that you immediately stimulate
direct deliveries to the ports and ship by the end of the month: 30,000
tonnes of wheat, 20,000 of barley, and 10,000 of rye, on top of what’s
been shipped already. Consider daily shipments to be your combat orders,
and send telegrams to the procurements committee.
Kuibishev*
Kuibishev*
* Valerian Kuibyshev (1888-1935) was the
Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Peoples’ Commissars (1930-1934)
and the Chairman of the State Planning Commission (1930-1935)
responsible for developing and overseeing the Soviet government’s
“Five-year Plans.”
TsDAHO Ukrayiny, fond 1, list 20, file 5446, sheet 23;
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv p. 235
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv p. 235
<Index>
#23 Resolution of AUCP(b) Politburo on expelling a foreign journalist
September 17, 1932
Expel the correspondent of “Daily
Express” [Rhea] Clyman from the USSR in two days’ time for clearly
defamatory, prevocational and completely fabricated information about
the USSR (article about “nationalization of women” in a Canadian
magazine, article about “uprisings and hunger riots” in the USSR in the
“Daily Express”), whose goal was to resentfully discredit the USSR in
the eyes of public opinion.
Publish this statement accordingly.
Publish this statement accordingly.
RGASPI, fond 17, list 3, file 901, sheet 6.
<Index>
#24 Telegram from SNK USSR and CC AUCP(b) denying sowing seed loans to collective farms
September 23, 1932
Resolution of SNK USSR and CC AUCP(b): a
number of local organizations have asked for seed loans for Soviet and
collective farms. Because this year’s harvest appears to be satisfactory
and because the government lowered state grain procurement targets,
which should be fully met, the SNK and CC resolve to: First, refuse all
requests concerning seed loans. Second, forewarn the Soviet and
collective farms that they will not be provided with seeds for winter or
spring sowing. Third, hold the chairmen of collective farms, directors
of MTS [machine tractor stations] and directors of Soviet farms
responsible for issuing all seed for spring sowing by the deadlines
established by the SNK and CC (no later than January 15, 1933) and for
ensuring its complete safekeeping.
Chairman, SNK USSR, V. Molotov (Skryabin)
Secretary, CC, J. Stalin
Secretary, CC, J. Stalin
TsDAHO Ukrayiny, fond 1, list 20, file 5362, sheet 8;
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv p.238.
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv p.238.
<Index>
#25 Resolution of CC AUCP(b) Politburo on grain procurements in Ukraine and the Norther Caucasus*
October 22, 1932
In order to strengthen grain procurement dispatch [the following persons] for two ten-day periods:
а) Comrade Molotov to Ukraine with a group comprised of Comrades Kalmanovich, Sarkis, Markevich, Krentsel.
b) Comrade Kaganovich to the N. Caucasus with Comrades Yurkin and Chernov in the group.
а) Comrade Molotov to Ukraine with a group comprised of Comrades Kalmanovich, Sarkis, Markevich, Krentsel.
b) Comrade Kaganovich to the N. Caucasus with Comrades Yurkin and Chernov in the group.
RGASPI, fond 17, list 3, file 904, sheet 11;
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv p.238.
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv p.238.
* Distrustful of local leaders, Stalin
dispatched his emissaries to these major grain producing areas. Using
wide-ranging repressions, they managed to extort all grain and food
reserves, resulting in millions of deaths.
<Index>
#26 Resolution of CC CP(b)U on strengthening role of courts in grain procurement
November 5, 1932
In order to strengthen the battle for
grain, the CC CP(b)U proposes the following measures be taken by the
Peoples’ Commissariat of Justice, and oblast and raion committees, in
order to ensure the decisive strengthening of assistance for grain
procurement from judicial bodies.
The Central Committee proposes to:
The Central Committee proposes to:
1. Mandate judicial bodies to hear grain
procurement cases out of turn, as a rule during mobile sessions on
location, with the application of austere repressions while ensuring a
differentiated approach to separate social groups and applying severe
measures against speculators and grain resellers.
2. Organize no fewer than five to ten
additional traveling judicial sessions of the Peoples’ courts to the
raions of every oblast.
Judicial consideration of matters and application of stringent repressions should be accompanied by a mass campaign mobilizing public support for the processes of strengthening the battle for grain.
Order the Peoples’ Commissariat of Justice to staff those hearings with strongly-prepared workers from among former court employees.
The formalities for appointing Peoples’ judges should take place immediately.
Judicial consideration of matters and application of stringent repressions should be accompanied by a mass campaign mobilizing public support for the processes of strengthening the battle for grain.
Order the Peoples’ Commissariat of Justice to staff those hearings with strongly-prepared workers from among former court employees.
The formalities for appointing Peoples’ judges should take place immediately.
3. Charge administrative bodies with
quickly taking all measures sanctioned by law for collecting undelivered
grain and administrative measures against malicious non-deliverers.
4. Request that oblast and raion
committees create the conditions for strengthening the work of judicial
and administrative bodies, in particular by immediately relieving all
prosecutors, judges and investigators from any mobilization, thus
affording them the ability and requiring their full participation in the
campaign to ensure the execution of the grain procurement plan from
their places of work.
The Peoples’ Commissariat of Justice and
Prosecutor should immediately issue detailed orders to judicial bodies
on activating their participation in grain procurement.
Make the central, and local press in particular, responsible for broad coverage of the court cases.
TsDAHO Ukrayiny, fond 1, list 6, file 237, sheet 177;
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv p. 247-248.
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv p. 247-248.
<Index>
#27 Telegram from the CC CP(b)U to the oblasts on economic blockade of raions not fulfilling grain procurement plans
November 6, 1932
CC CP(b)U resolves to reduce the delivery
of goods (except for matches, salt and kerosene) to those raions that
have fallen the furthest behind in grain procurements.
In your oblasts, the measure will be carried out in the following raions: (list of raions)*
Provide your changes to the list of raions by telegraph no later than 9.ХІ.
In your oblasts, the measure will be carried out in the following raions: (list of raions)*
Provide your changes to the list of raions by telegraph no later than 9.ХІ.
Secretary, CC CP(b)U, Kosior
TsDAHO Ukrayiny, fond 1, list 20, file 5384, sheet 111.
* The list included 8 raions in Odesa,
Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv oblasts, 5 in Kyiv oblast, and 2 in Donetsk
oblast. Grain procurement quotas were less than 30 percent fulfilled in
these raions.
<Index>
#28 Resolution of the CC CP(b)U Politburo on measures to strengthen grain procurement (excerpt)
November 18, 1932
III. On grain procurements from collective farms
On collective farm reserves
In accordance with the resolution of the
CC AUCP (b) stating that “the fulfillment of the grain procurement plan
is the highest priority mission for collective farms, Soviet farms, MTS
[machine and tractor stations] and private farmers,” the Central
Committee of the Communist Party (bolsheviks) of Ukraine expressly
points out to all Party organizations in Ukraine that the full
performance of grain procurement plans is the principal duty of all
collective farms and MTS before the Party and the working class, the
highest priority task to which of all other collective farm tasks are
subordinate, including the formation of various collective farm
reserves: seed grain, fodder, food supplies and others.
In accordance with the above, the CP(b)U CC informs Party organizations that:
1. The mission of Party organizations is
the full performance of the grain procurement plans by January 1 and
formation of seed reserves by January 15.
2. A ban shall be immediately instituted
on any and all natural reserves stored in collective farms that are
failing to perform grain procurement plan; these reserves shall be
inspected [to determine] their real size, places of storage, individuals
responsible for their safekeeping; this matter shall be placed under
the direct control of raion executive and Party committees.
3. Raion executive committees shall be
authorized to transfer all reserves stored by collective farms that are
failing to perform grain procurement plans to the grain procurement
reserves.
4. Where sowing seed reserves are
concerned, paragraph 3 shall only be implemented upon prior consent of
oblast executive committees for each separate collective farm.
The CC CP(b)U considers following these
instructions on natural reserves to be exceptionally important and
places political responsibility for their correct implementation upon
oblast Party committees, foremost upon the first secretaries and the
chairmen of executive committees.
On in-kind fines and combating abuses in collective farms
1. Upon receipt of this decree, the
distribution of any in-kind natural [grain] advances to all collective
farms failing to perform grain procurement plans shall be discontinued.
2. The return of illegally-distributed
grain shall be immediately organized in those collective farms that are
failing to perform grain procurement plans and have distributed more
than the established quotas designated for public consumption and are
engaged in additional distribution of different types of lower grade
grains, byproducts, etc.; this grain shall be handed over for the
fulfillment of grain procurement plans.
The chairmen of these collective farms (Communists and non-Party members) shall be held responsible for the misappropriation of collective farm grain; incorrectly-distributed grain shall be first seized from the board members and administrative staff of these collective farms (accountants, store-keepers, field workers, etc.).
The chairmen of these collective farms (Communists and non-Party members) shall be held responsible for the misappropriation of collective farm grain; incorrectly-distributed grain shall be first seized from the board members and administrative staff of these collective farms (accountants, store-keepers, field workers, etc.).
3. The seizure of grain stolen from
collective and Soviet farms during crop harvesting, milling,
transportation, storage, etc., by collective and private farmers,
especially thieves and loafers without any workdays, and grain reserves,
shall be organized immediately in all raions.
In implementing this measure, it is necessary to secure the support of the best collective farmers for working in the fields, milling and other collective farm jobs, without resorting to mass searches of collective and private farmers.
In implementing this measure, it is necessary to secure the support of the best collective farmers for working in the fields, milling and other collective farm jobs, without resorting to mass searches of collective and private farmers.
4. In those collective farms failing to
perform grain procurement plans, all the grain harvested by collective
farmers from their home garden plots shall be counted as their in-kind
payment for workdays; any excess grain shall be collected towards grain
procurements.
5. Fines shall be levied on those
collective farms that permitted the stealing of grain and are
maliciously undermining grain procurement plans in the form of
additional meat procurement targets: they will supply a 15-month quota
of meat from collectivized and privately-owned livestock.
Fines shall be imposed by raion executive
committees upon prior consent of oblast executive committees for each
separate case. Furthermore, raion executive committees shall establish
deadlines and sizes of fines for each collective farm (within the limits
of the 15-month meat quota) according to the conditions in each
collective farm.
The collection of fines shall not release
collective farms from their duties to fully perform grain procurement
plans. If a collective farm takes active measures to fully meet its
grain procurement targets by a set date, then a fine may be cancelled
upon prior consent of the oblast executive committee. [...]
On measures to combat kulak influence in collective farms and village party organizations
For the purposes of overcoming kulak
resistance and fully performing grain procurement plans, the CC CP(b)U
resolves the following:
1. Collective farms that are maliciously sabotaging state grain procurement plans shall be blacklisted.
The following measures shall be imposed upon blacklisted collective farms:
The following measures shall be imposed upon blacklisted collective farms:
а) Immediate suspension of delivery of
goods, cooperative and state trade activities in these villages and
removal of all available goods from cooperative and state stores;
b) Full prohibition of kolhosp trading activities between collective farms, collective and private farmers.
c) Suspension of all crediting activities and a demand for pre-term collection of credits and other financial obligations;
d) Investigation and purging of
collective farms in these villages, followed by the removal of
counterrevolutionary elements and the organizers of grain-collection
disruptions;
e) Oblast executive committees shall
blacklist and warn collective farms about being blacklisted by issuing
appropriate resolutions.
Oblast executive committees shall immediately report the collective farms being blacklisted to the CC.
Oblast executive committees shall immediately report the collective farms being blacklisted to the CC.
IV. On grain procurements from private farmers
1. Fines shall be levied on those private
farmers who are maliciously undermining grain procurement plans (be
they contractual or voluntary obligations) in the form of additional
meat procurement target to supply a 15-month quota of meat.
These fines shall be imposed by village executive committees upon prior consent of raion committees in each separate instance. Furthermore, village councils shall establish the deadlines and size of fines for each household within the limits of 15-month meat and one-year potato quotas, depending on the conditions in each farm.
These fines shall be imposed by village executive committees upon prior consent of raion committees in each separate instance. Furthermore, village councils shall establish the deadlines and size of fines for each household within the limits of 15-month meat and one-year potato quotas, depending on the conditions in each farm.
The payment of fines shall not release the farms from their duty to fully perform the grain procurement plan.
If private farmers fully perform grain delivery plans by established deadlines, then the fines may be cancelled by decision of raion executive committees.
In certain raions (subject to approval by oblast executive committee resolutions) fines may be levied in the amount of a one-year potato quota.
Fines may be doubled in extraordinary circumstances, subject to approval by special resolutions of oblast executive committees.
If private farmers fully perform grain delivery plans by established deadlines, then the fines may be cancelled by decision of raion executive committees.
In certain raions (subject to approval by oblast executive committee resolutions) fines may be levied in the amount of a one-year potato quota.
Fines may be doubled in extraordinary circumstances, subject to approval by special resolutions of oblast executive committees.
2. The CC warns all local Party
organizations and workers against substituting consolidated work in the
battle for grain with the simple administration and wide-scale levying
of fines. The purpose of in-kind fines is to ensure full performance of
grain procurement plans.
3. To immediately collect seed grain and
foodstuff loans given to private farmers by collective farms in their
raions without recourse for appeal; in cases where loans issued to
private farmers were repaid by collective farms (in Vinnytsia oblast,
for example), the loans shall be collected from the private farmers and
credited to the collective farms’ grain procurement targets.
4. Organize brigades consisting of
collective farm activists (from a given village or those in the area)
from collective farms that have fully performed their grain procurement
plans, or are on the verge of doing so, to assist in the full
performance of grain procurement plans by the private farming sector.
Organize, by December 1, at least 1,100 of these collective farmer brigades throughout Ukraine, according to the following oblasts and numbers:
Organize, by December 1, at least 1,100 of these collective farmer brigades throughout Ukraine, according to the following oblasts and numbers:
| Vinnytsia -200 | Kyiv -300 |
| Chernihiv -100 | Kharkiv -350 |
| Odesa - 50 | Dnipropetrovsk - 50 |
| Donbas - 50 |
5. Private farmers who have
conscientiously performed their grain procurement duties, especially
those who have done so ahead of schedule, shall be recognized by
resolutions of village executive committees, assistance commissions,
etc., and shall be included in the grain procurement brigades,
assistance commissions and so forth.
6. Kulaks who have failed to deliver
grain shall be subject to repressions provided by Article 58 of the
Criminal Code, either through judicial or administrative proceedings.
[...]
TsDAHO Ukrayiny, fond 1, list 6, file 237, sheets 207-216;
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv p.250-260
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv p.250-260
<Index>
#29 Resolution of the CC AUCP(b) Politburo on establishing a death sentence commission in the Ukrainian SSR*
November 22, 1932
To present the CC CP(b)U with a special
commission comprised of comrades [Stanislaw] Kosior, Redens and Kisilev
(TsKK) who, during the grain procurement period, are authorized to make
final decisions in issues of highest punishment, and for the CC CP(b)U
to report to the CC AUCP(b) once every ten days concerning its
decisions.
RGASPI, fond 17, list 162, file 14, sheet17.
* The proposed resolution was submitted by the Molotov-led commission in Ukraine on November 21.
<Index>
#30 Resolution of CC AUCP(b) Politburo on silver purchases by Torgsin*
November 25, 1932
To adopt the proposal agreed upon by comrades Rozenholtz, Hrynko and Arkus:
a) Allow Torgsin to accept residential silver and old (pre-revolutionary) silver coins.
b) The Peoples’ Commissariat of External
Trade will establish the raions where Torgsin will accept household
silver and old (pre-revolutionary) silver coins, under the condition
that the measures will not be introduced early in those raions where
significant quantities of gold can still be found.
c) Establish the value of silver with a discount on gold parity of 10 to 15 percent.
d) The Peoples’ Commissariat of External
Trade, in agreement with the Peoples’ Commissariat of Finance and the
State Bank, will establish the list of Torgsin outlets where the sale of
silver will occur.
RGASPI, fond 17, list 162, file 14, sheet 17
* Torgsin - All-Union Association for
Trade (torgovlya) with Foreigners (s inostrantsyami). The Ukrainian
operations of Torgsin began in June, 1932. During the famine, Torgsin
traded grain in exchange for precious metals and hard currency from the
local population.
<Index>
#31 Telegram from USSR SNK Deputy Chairman to the Ukrainian SSR RNK and CC on the unconditional fulfillment of grain export plans
December 3, 1932
On orders of the Council of Peoples’
Commissars, 25,000 tonnes of wheat for export was to be collected in 15
days beginning on 20.ХI. As of the first [of the month] only 13,000 have
been shipped. Regardless of conditions, you are to completely fulfill
the plans for wheat, barley and corn by December 12.
Deputy chairman, Sovnarkom,
Kuibishev
Kuibishev
RGAE, fond 8040, list 6, file 6, page 36.
<Index>
#32 Resolution of the Ukrainian SSR RNK and CC CP(b)U on blacklisting villages that maliciously sabotage grain procurements
December 6, 1932
In consideration of the shameful failure
of grain procurement in several raions of Ukraine, the RNK and CC charge
oblast executive and Party committees, raion executive and Party
committees with the tasks of: putting an end to grain procurement
sabotage organized by kulak and counterrevolutionary elements, breaking
the resistance of rural Communists who have become sabotage leaders,
liquidating passivity and indifference to saboteurs, which is
incompatible with being a Party member, and ensuring the faster pace and
full and unconditional completion of the grain procurement plan.
The RNK and CC resolve:
For the overt undermining of the grain
procurement plan and malicious sabotage organized by kulak and
counterrevolutionary elements, place the following villages on the
blacklist:
Verbka, Pavlohrad raion, Dnipropetrovsk
oblast; Havrylivka, Mezhiv raion, Dnipropetrovsk oblast; Lutenka, Hadya
raion, Kharkiv oblast; Kamyani Potoky, Kremenchuk raion, Kharkiv oblast,
Svyatotritske, Troytsia raion, Odesa oblast and the village of Pisky,
Bashtan raion, Odesa oblast.
Concerning these villages, the following measures should be adopted:
1. Immediate suspension of delivery of
goods and of local cooperative and state trading activities, and the
removal of all available goods from the cooperative and state stores.
2. Fully prohibit kolhosp trading for collective and private farmers.
3. Suspend all crediting activities, conduct pre-term collection of credits and other financial obligations.
4. Inspect cooperative and state
apparatuses and [ensure] their cleansing of various alien and enemy
elements by RSI [Worker-Farmer Inspection] units.
5. Inspect kolhosps in these villages and
purge them of counter-revolutionary elements and organizers of grain
procurement sabotage.
The RNK and CC appeal to all honest collective farmers loyal to the Soviet government and proletarian-private farmers with this appeal to organize all your forces in the ruthless battle with kulaks and their supporters, and put an end to the kulak sabotage of grain procurement in your villages – for the diligent performance of grain procurement commitments before the Soviet state, for the strengthening of collective farms.
The RNK and CC appeal to all honest collective farmers loyal to the Soviet government and proletarian-private farmers with this appeal to organize all your forces in the ruthless battle with kulaks and their supporters, and put an end to the kulak sabotage of grain procurement in your villages – for the diligent performance of grain procurement commitments before the Soviet state, for the strengthening of collective farms.
Chairman, Council of Peoples’ Commissars Ukrainian SSR, V. Chubar
Secretary CC CP(b)U, S. Kosior
Secretary CC CP(b)U, S. Kosior
Visti VUTsVK newspaper, December 8, 1932;
Collectivization and famine in Ukraine.1929-1933. (Kyiv, 1992, 734 pp) Kolektyvizatsia i holod na Ukraini 1929-1933 p.563.
Collectivization and famine in Ukraine.1929-1933. (Kyiv, 1992, 734 pp) Kolektyvizatsia i holod na Ukraini 1929-1933 p.563.
<Index>
#33 Telegram from Ukrainian SSR RNK and CC CP(b)U to the heads of Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa and Kharkiv oblasts on blacklisting villages
December 6, 1932
The CC and RNK propose ensuring the full
and immediate realization of the CC and RNK resolution on blacklisting
villages in your oblasts.
All the measures set forth in the CC and RNK resolution shall be resolutely and fully implemented in order to demonstrate… that the Soviet authorities can mercilessly deal with instigators of grain procurement sabotage, kulaks and their accomplices. Comprehensive preparations for implementing all the planned measures shall be promptly completed. In line with the resolution, a large-scale political campaign against grain procurement saboteurs shall be launched without delay, particularly in the raions directly concerned, including the publication of the village names mentioned in the CC and RNK resolution in all oblast and raion newspapers. The same large-scale work shall be conducted in the collective farms and villages, in accordance with the resolution.
Feedback to this resolution shall be organized from adjacent villages, collective farms and raions to publicly influence the blacklisted villages.
In the villages that have fallen under kulak influence, blacklisted by the CC and RNK resolution, it is necessary to arrange the organizational and political work in such a way that will make it possible to snatch the best collective and private farmers out of kulaks’ hands and, with their active help, finish off the kulaks and their accomplices and eradicate their influence at collective farms and among private farmers, thus achieving fulfillment of the grain procurement program.
All the measures set forth in the CC and RNK resolution shall be resolutely and fully implemented in order to demonstrate… that the Soviet authorities can mercilessly deal with instigators of grain procurement sabotage, kulaks and their accomplices. Comprehensive preparations for implementing all the planned measures shall be promptly completed. In line with the resolution, a large-scale political campaign against grain procurement saboteurs shall be launched without delay, particularly in the raions directly concerned, including the publication of the village names mentioned in the CC and RNK resolution in all oblast and raion newspapers. The same large-scale work shall be conducted in the collective farms and villages, in accordance with the resolution.
Feedback to this resolution shall be organized from adjacent villages, collective farms and raions to publicly influence the blacklisted villages.
In the villages that have fallen under kulak influence, blacklisted by the CC and RNK resolution, it is necessary to arrange the organizational and political work in such a way that will make it possible to snatch the best collective and private farmers out of kulaks’ hands and, with their active help, finish off the kulaks and their accomplices and eradicate their influence at collective farms and among private farmers, thus achieving fulfillment of the grain procurement program.
In order to perform these tasks, send
responsible comrades (provide names to the CC) along with a team of
resolute Party members on a mission to establish daily control and
effective day-to-day management of activities in these villages.
This directive shall be communicated to all oblast committees and RNK for implementation.
This directive shall be communicated to all oblast committees and RNK for implementation.
Secretary of CC CP(b)U, S. Kosior
Chairman of RNK of Ukrainian SSR, V. Chubar
RGASPI, fond 17, list 26, file 55, sheets 73-74;
Tragedy of the Soviet countryside. Collectivization and dekulakization, documents and materials in five volumes. Vol. 3. (Мoscow, 2001, 1007 pp) Tragedia sovietskoi derevni. Kolektyvizatsia i raskulachivanie. Dokumenty i materialy: v 5 tomakh pp.563-564.
Chairman of RNK of Ukrainian SSR, V. Chubar
RGASPI, fond 17, list 26, file 55, sheets 73-74;
Tragedy of the Soviet countryside. Collectivization and dekulakization, documents and materials in five volumes. Vol. 3. (Мoscow, 2001, 1007 pp) Tragedia sovietskoi derevni. Kolektyvizatsia i raskulachivanie. Dokumenty i materialy: v 5 tomakh pp.563-564.
<Index>
#34 Telegram from Chubar to Kuibishev on grain export plan performance
December 9, 1932
In response to your [telegram] № 10812,* I
hereby inform you thatБ according to statistics from Zahotzerno, as of
December 7, Eksportkhlib has fulfilled the plans by 110 percent.
According to grain: wheat 23,758 tonnes (95 percent), barley 38,819
tonnes (111 percent), corn 36,920 (121 percent). Categorical orders have
been issued to fully fill the wheat plan.
Chubar
RGAE, fond 8040, list 6, file 6, sheet 31.
* See Document 31
<Index>
#35 Resolution of CC AUCP(b) and USSR SNK on grain procurements in Ukraine, the Northern Caucasus and the Western Oblast
December 14, 1932
On hearing reports from Comrades
Rumiantsev, Secretary of the Western Oblast Party committee; Kosior,
Secretary of the CC CP(b)U; Stroganov, Secretary of the Dnipropetrovsk
oblast Party committee; and Sheboldaev, Secretary of the North Caucasus
regional Party committee, the CC AUCP(b) and the SNK USSR resolve the
following:
1. The CC CP(b)U and the Ukrainian SSR
RNK, on the personal responsibility of Comrades Kosior and Chubar, shall
fully complete the grain and sunflower seed procurement plan by the end
of January 1933.
2. The North Caucasus regional Party and
executive committees, on the personal responsibility of Comrades
Sheboldaev and Larin, shall fully complete the procurement plan for
grain by January 10 to 15, 1933, and for sunflower seeds by the end of
January 1933.
3. The Western Oblast Party and executive
committees, on the personal responsibility of Comrades Rumiantsev and
Shelekhes, shall fully complete the procurement plan for grain by
January 1, 1933, and for flax by February 1, 1933.
4. In view of extremely poor efforts and
the absence of revolutionary vigilance in a number of local Party
organizations in Ukraine and the North Caucasus, a significant number of
raions has been infiltrated by counterrevolutionary elements: kulaks,
former officers, petlurites, supporters of the Kuban Rada, and so on.
They have managed to find their way into collective farms as directors
and other influential administration members, accountants, storekeepers,
threshing floor foremen, and so on. They have succeeded in infiltrating
village councils, land management bodies and cooperative societies, and
are now trying to direct the work of these organizations against the
interests of the proletarian state and Party policy, as well as trying
to organize a counterrevolutionary movement and sabotage of the harvest
and sowing campaigns. The CC AUCP(b) and SNK USSR order the CC CP(b)U,
North Caucasus regional Party and executive committees and the RNK of
Ukraine to resolutely root out these counterrevolutionary elements by
means of arrest and long-term imprisonment in concentration camps,
without stopping short of capital punishment for the most malicious
elements.
5. The CC and RNK instruct party and
government organizations of the Soviet Union that the worst enemies of
the Party, working class, and collective farm peasantry are the
saboteurs of grain procurement who have Party membership cards in their
pockets. To please kulaks and other anti-Soviet elements, they organize
state fraud and double-deals, and fail to complete tasks established by
the Party and government. The CC and RNK order appropriate structures to
apply austere repressions against these traitors and enemies of Soviet
rule and collective farms, who still carry Party membership cards in
their pockets: five to ten year terms of imprisonment in concentration
camps and, under certain circumstances, execution by shooting.
6. The CC and RNK point out that instead
of the correct Bolshevik implementation of nationality policy,
“ukrainization” was carried out mechanically in a number of raions of
Ukraine, failing to take into consideration the peculiarities of every
raion and without the meticulous selection of Bolshevik cadres. This
made it easier for bourgeois-nationalist elements, petliurites and
others to create their legal facades and counterrevolutionary cells and
organizations.
7. The CC and RNK especially point out to
the Party and executive committees of the North Caucasus region that
the irresponsible, anti-Bolshevik “ukrainization” which affected nearly
half of the raions in the North Caucasus do not correspond to the
cultural interests of the population. It was carried out with a complete
lack of supervision on the part of territorial agencies over the
ukrainization of schools and the press, and provided the enemies of
Soviet rule with legal facades for organizing resistance to the
endeavors of Soviet authorities by kulaks, [czarist] officers,
re-emigrating kozaks, members of the Kuban Rada, etc. In order to crush
the resistance to grain procurement by kulak elements and their “Party”
and non-party flunkeys, the CC and SNK USSR resolve the following:
а) To relocate the entire population of
the most counterrevolutionary “Poltava” stanytsia (Northern Caucasus) to
the northern oblasts of the USSR in the shortest time possible, with
the exception of those collective and individual farmers who are truly
loyal to Soviet rule and who have not been implicated in grain
procurement sabotage. Populate this village with conscientious
collective farmers who are Red Army soldiers and are currently working
in territories that suffer from shortages and poor quality of land.
Transfer all lands, winter crops, buildings, inventory and livestock
from the farmers being expelled to these settlers.
Responsibility for implementing this
resolution (paragraph “a”) shall rest with Comrades Yagoda, Gamarnik
(with Comrade Bulygin as his substitute), Sheboldaev, and Yevdokimov.
b) Prosecute and sentence traitors of the
Party who were arrested in Ukraine for organizing the sabotage of grain
procurement to five-ten year terms in concentration camps: former raion
secretaries, chairmen of executive committees, directors of land
management bodies and chairmen of raion associations of collective
farms, specifically: Golovin, Pryhoda, Palamarchuk, Ordelian and
Lutsenko in Orikhiv raion; Khoroshko, Us’ and Fishman in Balakliya
raion; Yaremenko in Nosiv raion; Liashenko in Kobeliaky raion; Lensky,
Kosiachenko, Dvornik, Zyka and Dolgov in Velykyi Tokmak raion.
c) Exile all former communists who were
expelled from the Party for sabotaging the sowing and grain procurement
campaigns to the northern oblasts as kulaks.
d) Propose that the CC CP(b)U and RNK of
Ukraine pay serious attention to the proper implementation of
ukrainization, to eliminate its mechanical implementation, to expel
petliurites and other bourgeois-nationalist elements from Party and
government organizations, to meticulously select and train Ukrainian
Bolshevik cadres and to ensure Party management of and supervision over
ukrainization on a regular basis.
e) Immediately change the language used
in offices of Soviet entities and cooperative societies, as well as all
newspapers and magazines in the ukrainized raions of the Northern
Caucasus, from Ukrainian to Russian, explaining that Russian is more
understandable to Kuban residents. Also, prepare to change the language
of instruction at schools to Russian by autumn. The CC and RNK order the
regional Party and executive committees to immediately investigate the
staff workers of schools in ukrainized raions.
f) In cancellation of a previous
resolution, allow delivery of goods to Ukrainian villages and grant
Comrades Kosior and Chubar the right to suspend delivery of goods to
particularly retrograde raions, until they fulfill the grain procurement
plan.
Chairman of the SNK USSR V. Molotov (Skryabin)
Secretary of the CC AUCP(b) J. Stalin
Secretary of the CC AUCP(b) J. Stalin
RGASPI, fond 17, list 3, file 911, sheets 42-44;
TsDAHO Ukrayiny, fond 1, list 20, file 5243, sheets 234-238;
Commanders of the Great Famine: V. Molotov and L. Kaganovich, trips to Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus. 1932-1933. (Kyiv, 2001, 399 p.) Komandyry velykoho holodu: poyizdky V. Molotova i L. Kaganovicha v Ukrainu i na Pivnichnyi Kavkaz. 1932-1933. pp.210-212.
TsDAHO Ukrayiny, fond 1, list 20, file 5243, sheets 234-238;
Commanders of the Great Famine: V. Molotov and L. Kaganovich, trips to Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus. 1932-1933. (Kyiv, 2001, 399 p.) Komandyry velykoho holodu: poyizdky V. Molotova i L. Kaganovicha v Ukrainu i na Pivnichnyi Kavkaz. 1932-1933. pp.210-212.
<Index>
#36 Resolution of the CC AUCP(b) and USSR SNK on ukrainization in the Far East Region, Kazakhstan, Central Asia, the Central Black Earth Oblast and other areas
“On ukrainization in DVK [Far-East
Region], Kazakhstan, Central Asia, TsChO [Central Black Earth Oblast]
and other areas of the USSR”*
December 15, 1932
The CC AUCP(b) and Council of Peoples’
Commissars firmly condemn the statements and suggestions made by
individual Ukrainian comrades about the mandatory ukrainization of
entire areas of the USSR (for example, the DVK [Far East Region],
Central Asia, the Central Black Earth Oblast, and so on). Statements of
this nature only play into the hands of those bourgeois-nationalist
elements who, after being chased out of Ukraine as malicious elements,
have emerged in newly ukrainized areas and continue their mischievous
work.
Authorize the regional Party and
executive committees of the DVK, oblast Party and executive committees
of Central Black Earth Oblast, Kazakh regional [Party] committee and
[regional] Council of Peoples’ Commissars to immediately discontinue
ukrainization in [their] regions, print all ukrainized newspapers,
printed materials and publications in the Russian language and, by
autumn 1933, prepare the introduction of Russian language school
instruction.
Secretary, CC AUCP(b), J. Stalin
Chairman, SNK USSR, V. Molotov (Skryabin)
GARF, fond 5446, list 18, file 466, sheet 177;
RGASPI, fond 17, list 3, file 911, sheet 43;
Commanders of the Great Famine: V. Molotov and L. Kaganovich, trips to Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus. 1932-1933. (Kyiv, 2001, 399 p.) Komandyry velykoho holodu: poyizdky V. Molotova i L. Kaganovicha v Ukrainu i na Pivnichnyi Kavkaz. 1932-1933. pp.312-313.
* The SNK USSR documents include A hand-written note: “Original kept by CC AUCP(b)”.
Chairman, SNK USSR, V. Molotov (Skryabin)
GARF, fond 5446, list 18, file 466, sheet 177;
RGASPI, fond 17, list 3, file 911, sheet 43;
Commanders of the Great Famine: V. Molotov and L. Kaganovich, trips to Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus. 1932-1933. (Kyiv, 2001, 399 p.) Komandyry velykoho holodu: poyizdky V. Molotova i L. Kaganovicha v Ukrainu i na Pivnichnyi Kavkaz. 1932-1933. pp.312-313.
* The SNK USSR documents include A hand-written note: “Original kept by CC AUCP(b)”.
<Index>
#37 Resolution of CC AUCP(b) and SNK USSR on grain procurement in Ukraine
December 19, 1932
1) In the opinion of CC AUCP(b) and SNK
USSR, if a fundamental breakthrough in grain procurements is not
organized immediately in Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa and Kharkiv oblasts, then
Ukraine will not have the strength to fulfill the plan that has been
reduced twice already, and is being openly undermined by Ukrainian
workers due to their lighthearted attitude towards their duties before
the Party and government.
2) The CC AUCP(b) and SNK USSR order
Comrades Kaganovich and Postyshev* to leave for Ukraine immediately in
order to provide assistance to the CC CP(b)U and Sovnarkom of Ukraine as
authorized representatives of the CC AUCP(b) and SNK USSR in the
critical oblasts of Ukraine, sharing the work with Kosior, Chubar and
Khatayevich** and adopting all necessary organizational and
administrative measures for fulfilling the grain procurement plan.
Secretary, CC, J. Stalin
Chairman, SNK USSR, V. Molotov (Skryabin)
Chairman, SNK USSR, V. Molotov (Skryabin)
RGASPI, fond 17, list 3, file 912, sheet 54;
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv. p.295;
Commanders of the Great Famine: V. Molotov and L. Kaganovich, trips to Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus. 1932-1933. (Kyiv, 2001, 399 p.) Komandyry velykoho holodu: poyizdky V. Molotova i L. Kaganovicha v Ukrainu i na Pivnichnyi Kavkaz. 1932-1933. p.314
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv. p.295;
Commanders of the Great Famine: V. Molotov and L. Kaganovich, trips to Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus. 1932-1933. (Kyiv, 2001, 399 p.) Komandyry velykoho holodu: poyizdky V. Molotova i L. Kaganovicha v Ukrainu i na Pivnichnyi Kavkaz. 1932-1933. p.314
* Pavel Postyshev (1887-1939) was
Secretary of the Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (1930-33).
He was Secretary of the Central Committee, Communist Party (bolshevik)
of Ukraine for two separate terms (1926-1930 and 1933-1937).
** Mendel Khatayevich (1893-1937) was a
member of the Politburo, Central Committee of the All-Union party from
1930. He was member a member of the Ukrainian Politburo (1932-1937) and
the first secretary of the Dnipropetrovsk oblast Communist Party
committee from 1933.
<Index>
#38 Telegram from Kaganovich to Stalin on cancelling the CC CP(b)U resolution from November 18, 1932*
December 22, 1932
I informed you yesterday that the
resolution of the Politburo of the CC CP(b)U dated November 29 has been
cancelled. However, the resolution of November 18 is still in effect (I
am sending it directly to you).
Although this decree begins with the
statement that performance of the grain procurement plan is the top
priority, it nevertheless provides grounds for permitting the creation
of all sorts of reserves in collective farms that have failed to fulfill
their grain procurement plans. The resolution states that seeds
reserves can only be submitted as grain procurement with permission from
oblast executive committees for each collective farm separately.
According to local workers, collective
farms’ seed reserves are being stocked, as are the insurance [reserves],
even in those collective farms where the grain procurement plans are
only 50 percent fulfilled. The very raising of the issue of creating and
securing reserves, as well as prohibiting the transfer of seed reserves
for grain procurement, provide the legal grounds and basis for
entrenching the widely-held view that the plans cannot be fulfilled,
although this is not said openly. Based on our conversations with oblast
workers and during visits to raions and collective farms, we are
convinced that this “preoccupation” with reserves, including seed
reserves, is seriously hampering and undermining the entire grain
procurement plan. These views are being reinforced by the resolution of
the CC CP(b)U dated November 18.
For these reasons we consider it necessary to also cancel the CC CP(b)U resolution.
Your prompt response will be highly appreciated.
Your prompt response will be highly appreciated.
Kaganovich, Chernov**
RGASPI, fond 81, list 3, file 232, sheet 62;
Commanders of the Great Famine: V. Molotov and L. Kaganovich, trips to Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus. 1932-1933. (Kyiv, 2001, 399 p.) Komandyry velykoho holodu: poyizdky V. Molotova i L. Kaganovicha v Ukrainu i na Pivnichnyi Kavkaz. 1932-1933 p.335
Commanders of the Great Famine: V. Molotov and L. Kaganovich, trips to Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus. 1932-1933. (Kyiv, 2001, 399 p.) Komandyry velykoho holodu: poyizdky V. Molotova i L. Kaganovicha v Ukrainu i na Pivnichnyi Kavkaz. 1932-1933 p.335
* This resolution is excerpted in Document 28.
** Mikhail Chernov (1891-1938) was
appointed deputy chairman of the SNK USSR Committee for Agricultural
Procurements in 1932. In April 1933, he became chairman of that
committee.
<Index>
#39 Letter from the CC CP(b)U on the mandatory shipment of all collective farm grain reserves, including sowing seed, to complete the grain procurement plan
To: Secretaries of Party raion and oblast committees, persons deputized by CP(b)U
December 24, 1932
In accordance with the cancellation of the CC CP(b)U resolution from November 18 concerning kolhosp inventories, we propose:
1. All collective farms that failed to
perform grain procurement plans have five days to ship, without
exception, all kolhosp reserves, including sowing seeds, to fulfill
grain procurement quotas.
2. Everyone resisting this measure, including communists, shall be arrested and tried.
3. Warn all collective farm heads that if
any hidden reserves, stores and the like are found after the set date,
then the chairman, and other guilty parties will be brought before the
courts and severely punished.
4. Order all raion Party council
secretaries, chairmen of raion executive committees and persons
authorized by oblast committees to deliver this resolution for signing
by the heads of collective farms in 24 hours’ time.
Kosior
Stroganov
Alekseiev
Stroganov
Alekseiev
TsDAHO Ukrayiny, fond 1, list 20, file 5384, sheet 230;
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv p. 296
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv p. 296
<Index>
#40 Minutes of the Berdyansk raion executive committee meeting on repressive measures against “blacklisted” collective farms (excerpt)
December 28, 1932
2. Listened [to report]: On using
measures towards collective farms that have been blacklisted by the
oblast executive committee (after surveying presidium members on
December 25, 1932).
2. Approved: For the continued malevolent
non-performance of the state grain procurement plan, for the
kulak-organized sabotage of the Shevchenko collective farm of the Novo
Oleksiy village council and the “Red banner” collective farm of the
Nohai village council, blacklisted by the oblast executive committee,
use the following measures:
a) Completely prohibit any trade between the kolhosps and collective farmers;
b) By December 28, 1932, collect credits
and all payments due (agriculture taxes, debts to state, insurance
payments) and cash debts owed by these kolhosps should be collected from
the collective farmers;
c) Impose and in-kind fine of 15 months
of meat and collect it by January 5, 1933, from the collective farmers
of these collective farms as pre-term meat procurement and in-kind
fines;
d) Immediately prohibit any milling by the kolhosps and collective farmers;
e) Send special brigades to these
kolhosps led by Comrades Kovalenko and Vitkin who, together with the
village councils and collective farm administrations, are responsible
for fully ensuring the implementation of all these measures by January
5, 1933.
Publish this resolution in the press.
Publish this resolution in the press.
Head, raion executive committee, Paliy
Secretary, raion executive committee, Mokshtadt
Secretary, raion executive committee, Mokshtadt
TsDAVO Ukrayiny, fond 1, list 8, file 309, sheet 74
<Index>
#41 Resolution of CC CP(b)U Politburo strengthening repressions against private farmers who maliciously hoard grain
December 29, 1932
Order the Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv
oblast committees to use the following repressions against malicious
private farmers in accordance with the RNK Ukrainian SSR resolution from
November 11, 1932: sale all their property and appropriate all farm
land and buildings. This measure should be used, for example, against
1,000 homesteads in Kharkiv oblast and 500 in Dnipropetrovsk oblast.*
TsDAHO Ukrayiny, fond 1, list 6, file 238, sheet 179
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv p.300.
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv p.300.
* On January 4, 1933, the CC AUCP(b)
approved the deportation of 200 families and 40 expelled communists from
Kharkiv oblast. On that day, the Ukrainian SSR Politburo also increased
the deportation quota for Dnipropetrovsk oblast to 700 rural families.
See Documents 46 and 45.
<Index>
#42 Letter from CC CP(b)U to oblast and raion Party committees on collecting all available reserves for grain procurement
December 29, 1932
Raion workers have not yet understood
that the #1 priority for grain procurement in those collective farms
that have failed to perform their duty before the state is the
submission of all available seed, including so-called sowing reserves,
towards the grain procurement plan.
Accordingly, the CC AUCP(b) has canceled the CC CP(b)U’s decision from November 18 on non-shipment of seed reserves that had weakened our positions in the battle for grain.
Accordingly, the CC AUCP(b) has canceled the CC CP(b)U’s decision from November 18 on non-shipment of seed reserves that had weakened our positions in the battle for grain.
The CC CP(b)U orders those collective
farms that have not fulfilled the grain procurement plan to immediately
hand over all available reserves, including so-called sowing seed, in
the course of five to six days, for the fulfillment of the grain
procurement plan.
Towards this end, the CC orders the
immediate mobilization of all transport vehicles, working animals,
automobiles and tractors. In one day’s time, orders should be issued for
the daily provision of the necessary number of horses, including for
private farmers.
Any delays in the sending out of reserves
will be considered by the CC to be sabotage of grain procurement by
raion leaders and will be met with commensurate measures.
Secretary CC CP(b)U S. Kosior
TsDAHO Ukraine, fond 1, list 6, file 238, sheet 182;
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through
the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606
pp) Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu
dokumentiv p.300-301
Commanders of the Great Famine: V.
Molotov and L. Kaganovich, trips to Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus.
1932-1933. (Kyiv, 2001, 399 p.) Komandyry velykoho holodu: poyizdky V.
Molotova i L. Kaganovicha v Ukrainu i na Pivnichnyi Kavkaz. 1932-1933
p.611.
<Index>
#43 Report from OGPU to Stalin on completion of the deportation of villagers from raions in Kuban
December 29, 1932
The deportation operation from the “Poltava” stanytsia in the Northern Caucasus was completed on December 27.
2,158 families (9,187 persons) have been deported in five trains to the Urals, where the necessary preparations for their arrival, lodgings and labor employment have been completed.
2,158 families (9,187 persons) have been deported in five trains to the Urals, where the necessary preparations for their arrival, lodgings and labor employment have been completed.
I also report that the deportation from 13 raions of Kuban region conducted earlier was completed by December 19.
Currently all 1,992 families (9,442 persons) deported from Kuban have been lodged and employed in Northern Kazakhstan and a special settlement in the Northern Region. The relocation of these communities took place without excesses.
Currently all 1,992 families (9,442 persons) deported from Kuban have been lodged and employed in Northern Kazakhstan and a special settlement in the Northern Region. The relocation of these communities took place without excesses.
Deputy chairman OGPU Yagoda **
APRF, fond 3, list 30, file 196, sheet 108;
Top Secret: From Lubianka to Stalin on the state of the country in 4 volumes (Moscow, 2001, Volume 4) “Sovershenno sekretno”. Lubianka - Stalinu o polozhenii v strane: v 4 t. p.386.
Top Secret: From Lubianka to Stalin on the state of the country in 4 volumes (Moscow, 2001, Volume 4) “Sovershenno sekretno”. Lubianka - Stalinu o polozhenii v strane: v 4 t. p.386.
* The deportation of residents from the
Poltava kozak village in the Northern Caucasus was conducted in
accordance with the Politburo CC AUCP(b) and SNK USSR resolution “On
grain procurements in Ukraine, North Caucasus and Western Oblast” from
December 14, 1932. (See Document 35.)
** Genrikh Yagoda (1891-1938) was deputy head of the OGPU (1924-34) and later the head of the NKVD (1934-36).
<Index>
#44 Resolution of the CC AUCP(b) Politburo on grain procurement in Ukraine *
January 1, 1933
The CC CP(b)U and Ukrainian SSR RNK shall
widely inform village councils, kolhosps, collective farmers and
proletarian private farmers that:
a) Those who hand in, to the state, any
grain that was previously misappropriated or concealed will not be
subject to repressions;
b) Those collective farms, collective
farmers and private farmers who stubbornly insist on misappropriating
and concealing grain will be subject to the strictest punitive measures
provided by the USSR Central Executive Committee’s resolution of August
7, 1932 “On the safekeeping of property of state enterprises, collective
farms and cooperatives and strengthening public (socialist) property.”
Secretary, CC AUCP(b), J. Stalin
RGASPI, fond 17, list 3, file 913, sheet 11.
* This unprecedented document illustrates
Stalin’s demand that Ukrainian farmers voluntarily give up hidden
grain. If they failed to do so, he openly threatened them with
repressions that included executions by shootings. The resolution was
delivered widely by telegraph to local government bodies. It inspired
mass inspections and confiscation of food from farmers. The August
resolution is excerpted in Document 19.
<Index>
#45 Resolution of Politburo CC AUCP(b) on repressions against villagers in Dnipropetrovsk oblast
January 1, 1933
To approve the following CC CP(b)U proposal:
1. Deport 700 families from 20-25 villages in the most retrograde raions.
2. Comrades Carlson and Redens will organize the deportation of 700 persons from [among the] malicious elements and kulaks (without families).
3. Compile a list of up to 50 members to be immediately expelled from the party and sent to a concentration camp.
1. Deport 700 families from 20-25 villages in the most retrograde raions.
2. Comrades Carlson and Redens will organize the deportation of 700 persons from [among the] malicious elements and kulaks (without families).
3. Compile a list of up to 50 members to be immediately expelled from the party and sent to a concentration camp.
RGASPI, fond 17, list 162, file 14, sheets 44-45.
<Index>
#46 Resolution of Politburo CC AUCP(b) on repressions against villagers in Kharkiv oblast
January 4, 1933
To approve the following CC CP(b)U proposal:
To deport 400 families, malicious elements and kulaks from Kharkiv oblast to the North, and 40 expelled Communist Party members also for deportation to the North.
To deport 400 families, malicious elements and kulaks from Kharkiv oblast to the North, and 40 expelled Communist Party members also for deportation to the North.
RGASPI, fond 17, list 162, file 14, sheet 45;
Top Secret: From Lubianka to Stalin on the state of the country in 4 volumes (Moscow, 2001, Volume 4) “Sovershenno sekretno”. Lubianka - Stalinu o polozhenii v strane: v 4 t. p.391
Top Secret: From Lubianka to Stalin on the state of the country in 4 volumes (Moscow, 2001, Volume 4) “Sovershenno sekretno”. Lubianka - Stalinu o polozhenii v strane: v 4 t. p.391
<Index>
#47 Report from the Voroshilov Party committee to the Donetsk oblast committee of the CP(b)U on blacklisting the kolhosp in Horodyshche for the systematic non-performance of grain procurement plans (excerpt)
January 4, 1933
Horodyshche village is the largest in
Voroshylov raion with more than 1,000 farms, mostly staroveri [old
believers] for whom farming has always been a supplementary source of
income as the overwhelming majority of homesteads have been
traditionally engaged in trade. This village was found to host the
largest kulak community.
Thus, the political campaign measures in
Horodyshche were implemented with great difficulty and encountered
active resistance from most of the population. In addition to the
malicious sabotage of Soviet government efforts, groups of bandits,
horse thieves, and the like used to live and hide in this village during
the civil war.
Over the years, the Horodyshche village has never fulfilled grain procurement plans.
The persistent neglect of activities conducted in the village by Party and Soviet authorities, cover-ups and familial relationships with dekulakized village leaders are well-preserved to this day, despite the three-year existence of the collective farm that includes most of the people in the village.
In 1931, the grain procurement plan was 10,000 centners [100 kilograms] for a grain crop sowing area of 4,647 hectares; it was 64 percent performed, whereas the plan for the [entire] raion was performed 105 percent.
The persistent neglect of activities conducted in the village by Party and Soviet authorities, cover-ups and familial relationships with dekulakized village leaders are well-preserved to this day, despite the three-year existence of the collective farm that includes most of the people in the village.
In 1931, the grain procurement plan was 10,000 centners [100 kilograms] for a grain crop sowing area of 4,647 hectares; it was 64 percent performed, whereas the plan for the [entire] raion was performed 105 percent.
The 1932 plan of 6.5 thousand centners was 23.9 percent performed as of January 2.
In the two months since the collective
farm has been blacklisted (November and December), 373 centners, or 5.6
percent of the annual plan, were delivered to the state, including 83
centners of re-threshed grain, 63 centners of what was obtained
illegally by farmers and 6 centners of stolen [grain]. [. . .]
A thorough investigation revealed that
the trade ban did not produce the desired effect, because the
population, acting through family members and relatives who work in
industry, continued consuming goods from the workers’ cooperative,
factory and village outlets.
Agricultural products are being secretly
carried away for sale by, mostly to Debaltsevo station. Horodyshche
farmers have 365 cows, 62 heifers, 56 horses, 10 pairs of oxen (in
addition to small livestock), 100 hectares of home garden plots, 28
hectares of orchards that provide large incomes for these farms through
the sale of agricultural products at the stations that are located
relatively close by.
The following measures were used:
1. In addition to the closing of village
stores and Donbastorh [Donbas trade network], strict and closed-list
distribution of goods was introduced to the coal miners’ and collective
farm workers’ cooperatives. One thousand and twenty family members of
collective and private farmers engaged in industrial production were
taken off the supply list.
2. Credits in the amount of 23,547 rubles were collected ahead of their scheduled repayment.
3. Three MTS [machine tractor station] tractors were seized from the collective farm.
4. An investigation into collective farm
personnel was conducted resulting in the purging of 58 persons (3
kulaks, 22 kulak relatives, 32 thieves, slackers, speculators and kulak
supporters). This group, which sought to demoralize the collective farm
and organized resistance, was expelled at a meeting of collective farm
worker teams with the support of the collective farm majority.
5. Forty-three kulak families that had
fled their previous place of residence in Horodyshche were returned to
the kulak settlement in the raion.
6. The leadership of the collective farm
was put on trial. The investigation uncovered serious abuses. The case
is now before the oblast court, where it was submitted on December 23.
No response has thus far been received.
7. The collective farm’s sowing seed reserves of 356 centners were requisitioned for the grain procurement campaign.
All these measures were implemented in combination with organized work with the public and the participation of the best the collective farm activists in the grain procurement campaign.
All these measures were implemented in combination with organized work with the public and the participation of the best the collective farm activists in the grain procurement campaign.
A city Party committee team of 10 leading raion activists is working in the collective farm.
In order to deliver a decisive blow to chronic sabotage by kulaks in Horodyshche, we ask the Party oblast committee to authorize the following additional repressive measures for the Horodyshche village collective farm:
In order to deliver a decisive blow to chronic sabotage by kulaks in Horodyshche, we ask the Party oblast committee to authorize the following additional repressive measures for the Horodyshche village collective farm:
1. Levy 15-month meat quota fines upon collective and private farmers.
2. Assign the best plots of the spare
1,300 hectares of land available to the collective farm to coal-mine
food producers, as repressions.
3. Dismiss at least 150 Horodyshche
village residents from [industrial] operations for taking active part in
the sabotage and derailment of the grain procurement campaign under the
guise of industrial laborers after discussing the list of those to be
dismissed with collective farm organizations and members.
4. Issue a warning to the collective farm
and residents of Horodyshche: If the sabotage of grain procurement and
the hiding of stolen grain continue, city organizations will ask the
government to resettle saboteurs to the northern oblasts and bring in
conscientious collective farmers from city suburbs to take their place;
the houses of collective farmers in villages situated near industrial
sites will be made available to industrial laborers in need of
accommodations.
5. Request the speedy dispatch of oblast court personnel in the case of the Horodyshche collective farm leadership.
Secretary, CP(b)U Voroshylov city committee, Kholokholenko
Commissioner of the oblast committee, Lyrev
Commissioner of the oblast committee, Lyrev
TsDAHO Ukrayiny, fond 1, list 20, file 6339, sheets 176-178;
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv pp. 311-314
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv pp. 311-314
<Index>
#48 Report of the Vice-Consul of Italy in Batumi to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy on the influx of refugees from Ukraine (excerpt)
January 20, 1933
[...] In the last half-year, the local
port has supported the massive resettlement of refugees from Ukraine to
these lands that have relatively abundant food supplies. Every steamship
that arrives from Odesa – they arrive three per week – usually delivers
one to two thousand Ukrainians. In the summer, it did not resemble
resettlement; it was more like trips for food supplies. Most of those
who arrived… brought with them anything that could be sold or traded;
flour and seeds were purchased to consume at home and also for resale in
Ukraine, where a deficit of such products provided the opportunity to
make substantial profits.
Authorities have prohibited the export of
produce on multiple occasions, but sometimes made concessions. Lately,
it seems the prohibition is in strict force. And now there is another
development that is broader, encompassing the entire USSR.
It was apparent that most of the refugees
fled in search of stability. They left the most afflicted areas to
settle here, where the means of existence and opportunities to obtain
food are more abundant. The effects of the unwanted population growth in
these areas did not take long to be felt: the deficit of many sorts of
edible goods grows acuter by the day and prices on the markets rise just
as quickly. Rumors abound about the number of refugees from different
regions of the USSR to Transcaucasia. Some estimate several million
refugees, but I think this a great exaggeration. Because Batumi is the
most natural and convenient entry point to Transcaucasia from Ukraine
and surrounding territories, such a significant movement of refugees
cannot take place in a short time without being a catastrophic,
uncontrolled resettlement of hordes of people. Their arrival is constant
but limited. I think that several hundred thousand is not far from the
true number.
[...] Recently, in addition to the
general measures Your Excellency knows well, the process of sending
these masses back to where they lived is underway. It’s truly a sad
scene, even though these are relatively easier times from the tragedy
thats lie ahead. While waiting for the steamship, the refugees are
gathered in the customs pack house; those who can pay for tickets are
separated from those unable to do so. A few hours prior to departure,
the latter are taken under police guard to the market, where they are
told to sell their clothes in order to make enough [money] to pay for a
ticket. Police prevent people from getting close; only those who want to
purchase something specific are allowed: a coat, a pair of boots or
something else. Naturally, the limited time does not give these wretches
any opportunity to barter and the buyers take advantage of this. This
all occurs under orders, silently, which does not diminish the sadness
of a scene that after a while begins to resemble a slave market. [...]
Royal vice-consul
Francesco Zasso
Francesco Zasso
Lettere da Kharkov, La carestia in
Ucraina e nel Caucaso del Nord nei rapporti dei diplomatici italiani,
1932-1933. A cura di Andrea Graziosi. - Torino, 1991, рp. 144-146.
Translated from Italian into Ukrainian by M. Varvartsev.
<Index>
#49 Report from Balitsky to the OGPU on the mass exodus of villagers from Ukraine*
January 22, 1933
The mass exodus of peasants from villages
primarily in Kharkiv, Odesa, Kyiv and from parts of Chernihiv oblasts
that began in late December, 1932, can be broken down as follows:
Kharkiv oblast: Incidents of flight have
been registered in 19 raions and 39 villages. A total of 20,129 people
have fled. Among them: 7,423 collective farmers, 12,698 private farmers
and eight Party activists.
Odesa oblast: Incidents of flight have
been registered in 19 raions, 177 villages and 228 collective farms. A
total of 3,447 individuals and 2,642 families have fled. Among them:
1,683 individual collective farmers, 1,259 collective farmer families,
1,320 individual private farmers, 1,007 private farmer families, 438
individual kulaks, 377 kulak families and six Party activists.
Kyiv oblast: Incidents of flight have
been registered in 27 raions and 437 villages. A total of 6,576 people
have fled. Among them: 1,287 collective farmers, 3,936 private farmers,
1,244 kulaks and 109 Party activists.
Chernihiv oblast: Incidents of flight
have been registered in nine raions and 68 villages. A total of 1,541
individuals and 146 families have fled. Among them: 146 individual
collective farmers, three collective farmer families, 1,246 private
farmers, 124 private farmer families, 141 individual kulaks, 19 kulak
families, and five Party activists.
All told, incidents of flight in these
oblasts have been registered in 74 raions, 721 villages, and 228
collective farms. A total of 31,693 individuals and 2,789 families have
left. Among them: 10,539 individual collective farmers and 1,262
collective farm families, 19,203 individual private farmers and 1,131
private farm families, 1,823 individual kulaks and 396 kulak families
and 126 Party activists. In most cases, the incidents of flight can be
attributed to the search for work. The fact that malicious
non-deliverers of grain prevail among those fleeing is evidence that
this exodus is from the countryside. Some of those fleeing from their
villages take their families along, boarding up their houses and hiding
their grain reserves with neighbors and relatives. Some of those fleeing
from the villages have buried their grain in the ground. In some
villages, those fleeing are primarily the heads of families. Most of
those fleeing their villages are headed to Donbas and large industrial
centers. The exodus of collective farmers is occurring on a much lower
scale than the flight of private farmers. There also incidents of
village council and collective farm chairmen, including “communists,”
leaving their villages without permission. “Communists” are fleeing from
their villages because they are afraid of facing repressions for the
sabotage of grain procurement and failure to perform the tasks set by
the Party.
Inspections of the Lozova and Sumy
railway junctions in Kharkiv oblast, where flight from villages is
particularly large in scale, showed high ticket sales for long-distance
trains in January this year: 16,500 tickets were sold at Lozova station
and 15,000 at Sumy station in January. The growth of ticket sales has
also been observed at the Pomoshchna station, Odesa oblast: in November,
879 tickets for long-distance trains were sold, 3,614 in December and
1,617 in the first half of January. No rapid spikes of long-distance
train ticket sales have been observed at other railway junctions. In
early January, in order to stop the flight from villages in a resolute
manner, Ukraine’s GPU began arresting the organizers and instigators of
the exodus and stepped up intelligence and information-gathering efforts
in places where mass exodus had occurred. More than 500 malicious
instigators of exodus have been arrested.
Ukraine’s GPU has been reporting to the CC CP(b)U and OGPU’s SPO [secret political division] on the mass exodus since December 25, 1932. I am issuing additional orders as per your instructions.
Ukraine’s GPU has been reporting to the CC CP(b)U and OGPU’s SPO [secret political division] on the mass exodus since December 25, 1932. I am issuing additional orders as per your instructions.
V. Balitsky
APRF, fond 3, list 30, file 189, sheets 7-10;
Top Secret: From Lubianka to Stalin on the state of the country in 4 volumes (Moscow, 2001, Volume 4) “Sovershenno sekretno”. Lubianka - Stalinu o polozhenii v strane: v 4 t. pp.393-394.
Top Secret: From Lubianka to Stalin on the state of the country in 4 volumes (Moscow, 2001, Volume 4) “Sovershenno sekretno”. Lubianka - Stalinu o polozhenii v strane: v 4 t. pp.393-394.
* On January 23, 1933, the Deputy Head of
the All-Union OGPU Georgi Prokofiev submitted this report from Vsevolod
Balitsky to Stalin. A handwritten note on the cover letter reads: “To
Molotov, Kaganovich, Postyshev, Stalin.”
<Index>
#50 Order from the USSR SNK and CC AUCP(b) on preventing the mass flight of starving villagers in search of food
January 22, 1933
The CC AUCP and the Council of Peoples’
Commissars of the USSR have received reports on the mass flight of
peasants “for bread” to the Central Black Earth Oblast, Volga, Moscow
Oblast, Western Oblast, and Belarus. The CC AUCP and USSR Sovnarkom do
not doubt that the flight of villagers and the exodus from Ukraine last
year and this year is [being] organized by the enemies of Soviet
government, S[ocial] R[evolutionarie]s and agents Poland with the goal
of spreading propaganda “through the peasants” against collective farms
and the Soviet government in the northern regions of the USSR. Last
year, the Party, Soviet and chekist structures of Ukraine missed that
counterrevolutionary undertaking by the enemies of Soviet rule. Last
year’s mistakes cannot be repeated this year.
First. The CC AUCP and the USSR Sovnarkom
order the Regional Council and the Official OGPU Representative in the
Northern Caucasus to prevent the mass departure of peasants from the
Northern Caucasus to other regions and entry into the region from
Ukraine.
Second. The CC AUCP and Sovnarkom order
the CC CP(b)U, Ukrainian SSR RNK, Balitsky and Redens to prevent the
mass departure of peasants from Ukraine to other regions and entry to
Ukraine from the Northern Caucasus.
Third. The CC AUCP and Sovnarkom order
the Official Representatives of the ОGPU in Moscow Oblast, Central Black
Earth Oblast, Western Oblast, Belarus, Lower Volga and Mid Volga to
arrest “peasants” fleeing north from Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus
and, after the filtration of counterrevolutionary elements, return the
remainder to their places of residence.
Fourth. The CC AUCP and Sovnarkom order Prokhorov to issue the corresponding commands through the GPU TO [transport division].
Chairman, Sovnarkom USSR, V.M. Molotov
Secretary, CC AUCP(b), J. Stalin*
Secretary, CC AUCP(b), J. Stalin*
RGASPI, fond 558, list 11, file 45, sheets 108-109;
Tragedy of the Soviet countryside.
Collectivization and dekulakization, documents and materials in five
volumes. Vol. 3. (Мoscow, 2001, 1007 pp) Tragedia sovietskoi derevni.
Kolektyvizatsia i raskulachivanie. Dokumenty i materialy: v 5 tomakh p.
635;
Top Secret: From Lubianka to Stalin on
the state of the country in 4 volumes (Moscow, 2001, Volume 4)
“Sovershenno sekretno”. Lubianka - Stalinu o polozhenii v strane: v 4 t.
p.391.
* The document is signed by Stalin; Molotov’s signature is missing.
<Index>
#51 Resolution of the CC CP(b)U Politburo on executing the January 22 Order from the USSR SNK and CC AUCP(b)
January 23, 1933
An order from SNK USSR and CC AUCP(b) in connection with mass exodus of peasants beyond the borders of Ukraine.
1. Send all oblast Party and executive committees the following order (attached).
2. Order the plenipotentiary of the Peoples’ Commissar of Railways (Comrade Lavryshchev) and Yuzhok GPU transport divisions to immediately inform all railway stations about the suspension of ticket sales [for destinations] beyond Ukraine’s borders to villagers who have not secured permission to leave from their raion executive committees or from industrial and construction state structures showing that they have been recruited for one job or another beyond Ukraine’s borders.
1. Send all oblast Party and executive committees the following order (attached).
2. Order the plenipotentiary of the Peoples’ Commissar of Railways (Comrade Lavryshchev) and Yuzhok GPU transport divisions to immediately inform all railway stations about the suspension of ticket sales [for destinations] beyond Ukraine’s borders to villagers who have not secured permission to leave from their raion executive committees or from industrial and construction state structures showing that they have been recruited for one job or another beyond Ukraine’s borders.
Secretary, CC CP(b)U, M. Khatayevich
To oblast committees,
oblast executive committees
oblast executive committees
Just like last year, a mass exodus of
peasants from several raions of Ukraine “for bread” to Moscow, Western,
Central Black Earth Oblasts and Belarus is underway. There are incidents
of nearly all private, and some collective farmers leaving villages.
There is no doubt that the flight of villagers and the exodus from
Ukraine, last year and this year, is [being] organized by the enemies of
Soviet government, S[ocial] R[evolutionarie]s and agents of Poland with
the goal of spreading propaganda “through the peasants” against
collective farms and Soviet government in the northern regions of the
USSR. Last year, the Party, Soviet and chekist structures of Ukraine
missed that counterrevolutionary venture by the enemies of Soviet
government. Last year’s mistakes cannot be repeated this year.*
CC CP(b)U and Ukrainian SSR RNK resolve to:
1. Immediately take decisive measures in
every raion to prevent the mass exodus of private and collective
farmers, in accordance with the GPU directive sent by Balitsky.
2. Investigate the activities of
individuals recruiting the labor force to leave Ukraine, place them
under strict control, prevent them from working and remove all suspected
counterrevolutionary elements.
3. Conduct widespread explanatory work
among collective and private farmers against voluntary departures and
abandonment of farms, and warn them that they will be arrested if they
depart for other regions.
4. Take measures to suspend the sale of
tickets [for travel] beyond Ukraine to villagers who do not have
permission to leave from their raion executive committees or industrial
and construction state structures showing they have been recruited for
one job or another beyond Ukraine’s borders.
Corresponding orders have been issued along the line of the Peoples’ Commissar of Railways and GPU transport [divisions].
Corresponding orders have been issued along the line of the Peoples’ Commissar of Railways and GPU transport [divisions].
5. Provide a brief factual report on the
state of affairs with the mass exodus of peasants in your oblasts no
later than six o’clock the evening of January 24.
Secretary, CC CP(b)U, Khatayevich
Chairman, Ukrainian SSR RNK, V. Chubar
Chairman, Ukrainian SSR RNK, V. Chubar
RGASPI, fond 17, list 42, file 80, sheets 9-11;
Tragedy of the Soviet countryside. Collectivization and dekulakization, documents and materials in five volumes. Vol. 3. (Мoscow, 2001, 1007 pp) Tragedia sovietskoi derevni. Kolektyvizatsia i raskulachivanie. Dokumenty i materialy: v 5 tomakh pp.635-636;
TsDAHO Ukrayiny fond 1, list 16, file 9, sheets 115-116;
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv pp.341-342
Tragedy of the Soviet countryside. Collectivization and dekulakization, documents and materials in five volumes. Vol. 3. (Мoscow, 2001, 1007 pp) Tragedia sovietskoi derevni. Kolektyvizatsia i raskulachivanie. Dokumenty i materialy: v 5 tomakh pp.635-636;
TsDAHO Ukrayiny fond 1, list 16, file 9, sheets 115-116;
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv pp.341-342
* The last two sentences of this
paragraph are the verbatim retelling of the order signed by Stalin on
January 22, 1933. (See Document 50).
<Index>
#52 Resolution of the CC AUCP(b) Politburo strengthening the CP(b)U Central Committee and oblast organizations
January 24, 1933
The CC AUCP(b) considers it to be
established fact that the Party organizations of Ukraine have failed to
perform the tasks assigned [to them] by the Party for organizing grain
procurement and fulfilling the grain delivery plan, even after its
threefold reduction.
The CC AUCP(b) considers the critical
oblasts that will decide the fate of Ukraine’s agriculture and should be
secured to be Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv oblasts.
The CC AUCP(b) resolves to:
1 ) Appoint Comrade Postyshev [to the posts of] Secretary CC CP(b)U, First Secretary of the Kharkiv oblast party committee and CC AUCP(b) Secretary.*
1 ) Appoint Comrade Postyshev [to the posts of] Secretary CC CP(b)U, First Secretary of the Kharkiv oblast party committee and CC AUCP(b) Secretary.*
2) Appoint Comrade Khataievich First
Secretary of the Dnipropetrovsk oblast Party committee while remaining
Secretary of the CC CP(b)U.
Appoint comrade Razumov First Secretary of the Odesa oblast Party committee.**
Relieve comrades Mayorov, Stroganov and Terekhov of their duties and send them to the CC AUCP(b) for further assignment.
Comrades Postyshev, Khataievich and Razumov should begin performing their new duties no later than January 30.
Appoint comrade Razumov First Secretary of the Odesa oblast Party committee.**
Relieve comrades Mayorov, Stroganov and Terekhov of their duties and send them to the CC AUCP(b) for further assignment.
Comrades Postyshev, Khataievich and Razumov should begin performing their new duties no later than January 30.
RGASPI, fond 17, list 3, file 914, sheet 13.
* Pavel Postyshev remained secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party until February 1934.
** The resolution concerning Razumov was canceled; Evgeniy Veger (1899-1938) was confirmed as the first secretary of the Odesa oblast committee of the CP(b)U. He was the first secretary of the Crimean ASSR’s Communist Party from 1930.
** The resolution concerning Razumov was canceled; Evgeniy Veger (1899-1938) was confirmed as the first secretary of the Odesa oblast committee of the CP(b)U. He was the first secretary of the Crimean ASSR’s Communist Party from 1930.
<Index>
#53 Summary from the Peoples’ Commissariat of Justice, Ukrainian SSR to the CC CP(b)U on the number of verdicts for the evasion of grain deliveries, sabotage and grain speculation (excerpt)
January 29, 1933
THE BATTLE FOR GRAIN BY JUDICIAL BODIES
Judicial repressions in Ukrainian SSR during the 4th five-day period of January 1933.
THE BATTLE FOR GRAIN BY JUDICIAL BODIES
Judicial repressions in Ukrainian SSR during the 4th five-day period of January 1933.
1. Non-delivery of grain
A. Number of repressions
In 182 raions of the Ukrainian SSR (data
on Vinnitsa oblast not provided), 1,306 people were convicted for
non-delivery of grain during the fourth five-day period of January,
which is on average more than seven convictions per raion.
The dynamics of judicial repressions for each five-day period in January is based on the following data:
The dynamics of judicial repressions for each five-day period in January is based on the following data:
1st five-day period - 6 per raion
2nd five-day period - 8 per raion
3rd five-day period - 6 per raion
4th five-day period - 7 per raion
Thus, in January, the numbers of
repressions in quantity were quite high and practically stable for each
five-day period. Minor fluctuations in the number of repressions for
different five-day periods are completely natural.
The greatest number of repressions were
applied in Chernihiv oblast (15 per raion), the fewest in Donetsk oblast
(2 per raion). The number of repressions applied in the key grain
oblasts is illustrated by the following data:
Dnipropetrovsk oblast - 11 per raion
Kharkiv oblast - 8 per raion
Odesa oblast - 6 per raion
B. Pressure along class lines
Of the 1,306 convicted of non-delivery of bread, 375 people (30 percent) were kulaks, 936 (70 percent) were contract farmers.
Compared to the [rest of] of January, the percentage and number of convicted grain hoarders fell slightly during the 4th five-day period. The breakdown of repressions applied to different social groups for each five-day period in January is illustrated as follows:
Compared to the [rest of] of January, the percentage and number of convicted grain hoarders fell slightly during the 4th five-day period. The breakdown of repressions applied to different social groups for each five-day period in January is illustrated as follows:
1st five-day January - kulaks 30 %
2nd five-day January - kulaks 33 %
3rd five-day January - kulaks 35 %
4th five-day January - kulaks 30 %
C. Severity of judicial repressions
A sufficiently harsh repression was
applied to most of those convicted of non-delivery of grain: 1,278
persons of 1,306 (97.7 percent) were sentenced to imprisonment, most for
terms over three years. Only 30 convicts (2.3 percent) were sentenced
to forced labor.
The breakdown of repressions in terms of severity for each five-day period in January is illustrated by the following data:
Imprisonment:
The breakdown of repressions in terms of severity for each five-day period in January is illustrated by the following data:
Imprisonment:
1st five-day January 98.6 %
2nd five-day January 98.5 %
3rd five-day January 98.5 %
4th five-day January 97.7 %
Thus, judicial repressions were stable in their severity for each five-day period.
D. Class line of repressions
Repressions have been correctly
differentiated towards various social groups of convicts: 99.5 percent
of kulaks and wealthy [convicts] were sentenced to imprisonment for more
than five years, while most of the 97 percent of contract farmers were
sentenced to imprisonment for less than five years. [ . . . ]
Peoples’ Commissar of Justice and Prosecutor General of Ukrainian SSR, Poliakov
Peoples’ Commissar of Justice and Prosecutor General of Ukrainian SSR, Poliakov
TsDAHO Ukrayiny, fond 1, list 20, file 6353, sheets 67-74;
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv pp.345-348
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv pp.345-348
<Index>
#54 Report from Yagoda to Stalin and Molotov on measures for preventing mass exodus of villagers from the Ukrainian SSR, Northern Caucasus and Belarusian SSR
February 2, 1933
In order to intercept people fleeing en
masse from Ukraine, the Northern Caucasus and Belarus, the OGPU’s
transport divisions have organized cordons and search groups on the
following roadways: N. Caucasus, Ukraine, South-Eastern, Western,
Ryazan, Ural, Zlatoustovsk, Oktiabrsk, Moscow-Kazan,
Moscow-Belarus-Baltic.
As a result of measures taken from
January 22 to 30, 24,961 persons were detained fleeing their places of
permanent residence, including 18,379 Ukrainians and 6,225 persons from
the Northern Caucasus, and 357 persons from other regions.
The number of people returned to their
places of residence is 16,046; 1,016 were arrested; the remaining 7,879
are being investigated
The breakdown of arrests on different roadways is as follows: 2,519 people were detained on the Northern-Caucasian: 2,192 were turned back, 98 were arrested, and 299 are being investigated. On the southern roads 12,842 people were detained, 6,763 sent back, 826 arrested, and 6,250 are being investigated. On the Southeastern, 3,555 people were detained, 2,266 sent back, 32 arrested, and 1,260 are being investigated. On the Western route, 2,274 were detained, 2,270 sent back, and 4 were arrested. On Ryazan-Uralsk, 134 people were detained 134, 7 were sent back, 127 are being checked. On Sam.-Zlat., 45 persons were detained, 22 were sent back and 23 are being checked. On Oktiabrsk, 427 were detained, 412 sent back, and 15 arrested. On Moscow-Kazan, 191 people were detained, 123 were turned back, and 8 were arrested. On Moscow-Kursk 1710 people were detained, 1,672 were sent back, and 18 arrested. On MBB, 264 people were detained, 249 were turned back and 15 were arrested.
The breakdown of arrests on different roadways is as follows: 2,519 people were detained on the Northern-Caucasian: 2,192 were turned back, 98 were arrested, and 299 are being investigated. On the southern roads 12,842 people were detained, 6,763 sent back, 826 arrested, and 6,250 are being investigated. On the Southeastern, 3,555 people were detained, 2,266 sent back, 32 arrested, and 1,260 are being investigated. On the Western route, 2,274 were detained, 2,270 sent back, and 4 were arrested. On Ryazan-Uralsk, 134 people were detained 134, 7 were sent back, 127 are being checked. On Sam.-Zlat., 45 persons were detained, 22 were sent back and 23 are being checked. On Oktiabrsk, 427 were detained, 412 sent back, and 15 arrested. On Moscow-Kazan, 191 people were detained, 123 were turned back, and 8 were arrested. On Moscow-Kursk 1710 people were detained, 1,672 were sent back, and 18 arrested. On MBB, 264 people were detained, 249 were turned back and 15 were arrested.
Deputy Chairman, OGPU, Yagoda
APRF, fond 3, list 30, file 189, sheets 26-27;
Top Secret: From Lubianka to Stalin on the state of the country in 4 volumes (Moscow, 2001, Volume 4) “Sovershenno sekretno”. Lubianka - Stalinu o polozhenii v strane: v 4 t. p. 398-399
Top Secret: From Lubianka to Stalin on the state of the country in 4 volumes (Moscow, 2001, Volume 4) “Sovershenno sekretno”. Lubianka - Stalinu o polozhenii v strane: v 4 t. p. 398-399
<Index>
#55 Complaint from Hanna Derevinskaya, Krasnopillya, to the Dnipropetrovsk city council about the requisition of food for grain procurement
February 26, 1933
To the City Council of Dnipropetrovsk oblast
from Citizen Derevinskaya, Hanna,
Krasnopillya
from Citizen Derevinskaya, Hanna,
Krasnopillya
STATEMENT
Please consider my statement on the
unruly work of brigades dispatched by the village council and the
representative of the Petrovsky factory.
On February 10, a grain procurement brigade came to me and asked that I voluntarily give what beans I could. From what I had left to feed the family I gave three kilograms but they took it all (40 kilograms).
On February 10, a grain procurement brigade came to me and asked that I voluntarily give what beans I could. From what I had left to feed the family I gave three kilograms but they took it all (40 kilograms).
On February 23, another brigade made up
of the same group came and requested potatoes which I received for labor
in workers’ gardens on days off for a family of four which works at the
Petrovsky factory; the potatoes received from the cooperative were only
for feeding our families. Despite the fact that the potatoes were
issued by the state and equally among the other workers who worked in
the gardens, including the head of the Petrovsky factory brigade, they
did not realize that they’re undermining spring sowing in the workers’
gardens. Acting on their own, they took 125 kilograms of potatoes and 38
kilograms of beets from the cellar. I have fulfilled the entire grain
procurement farming quota. I ask your assistance in returning the
confiscated food issued by the cooperative.
Appellant Derevinskaya 26.II.1933
DA Dnipropetrovsk oblast, fond 416, list
1, file 113, sheet 331; Collectivization and famine in
Ukraine.1929-1933. (Kyiv, 1992, 734 pp) Kolektyvizatsia i holod na
Ukraini 1929-1933, p. 612.
<Index>
#56 Report from the GPU Ukrainian SSR on the mass exodus from Ukrainian villages and operational measures for combating flight
February 1933
The mass exodus of peasants from
villages, mostly malicious non-deliverers of grain, was observed over
the course of the grain procurement campaign in December and January.
In order to prevent flight from villages,
GPU units implemented a number of resolute measures, including: the
unconditional ban on issuing any travel documents by village councils;
the mobilization of secret agents and village activists to uncover
exodus organizers; the creation of mobile patrols by GPU transport
divisions and raion bodies; the arrest of exodus organizers and
instigators; the request for raion authorities to conduct public
education campaigns.
The results of the measures from January 23 to February 2 are as follows:
Mobile patrols detained and filtered
3,861 persons in Ukraine’s raions; 3,521 people were returned to their
permanent places of residence and 340 were arrested, including kulaks,
persons without identification, criminals and those who refused to
return to their places of residence.
Kulaks and individuals who refused to return are being prepared for exile while others are being investigated and screened out.
252 exodus organizers and instigators were arrested. Paperwork for sending them to concentration camps is near completion.
During the same period, mobile patrols detained and filtered 16,733 persons on Ukraine’s railways:
Collective farmers - 7,106
Private farmers - 7,870
Kulaks - 507
Collective farmers - 7,106
Private farmers - 7,870
Kulaks - 507
Among the detainees there are 138 persons
from the Belarusian SSR, 450 from the Central Black Earth Oblast, 127
from the North Caucasus region, and 192 from the rest of the Union.
15,109 were returned to their places of
permanent residence, 1,610 were arrested and delivered to local GPU
units, and nine individuals who refused to return were sent to special
settlements in Kazakhstan.
8,257 people were returned to Ukraine from the Central Black Earth Oblast.
As a result of these measures, incidents
of flight and the propensity to flee have been significantly reduced.
For example, from January 15 to 23, before active measures were
implemented, 9,236 people left Donetsk oblast; from January 25 to 31,
only 325 persons fled that oblast.
In Dnipropetrovsk oblast, which saw the
greatest exodus, 15,210 persons left before active measures were taken;
1,255 left from January 25 to February 1. Although incidents of flight
have fallen sharply, the propensity to flee among private and collective
farmers still exists in that oblast.
According to statistics for Vinnytsia
oblast, the flow of fleeing people is slowing down. From January 30 to
31, not a single person was detained by 11 mobile patrols along that
oblast’s railways.
Incidents of people returning after
fleeing, which have increased due to the publication of the governmental
resolution on mandatory grain deliveries to the state, have been
registered in a number of raions in that oblast: 401 people returned
from January 28 to 31.
Incidents of people returning after fleeing have also been registered in other oblasts.
According to statistics from GPU
divisions, the flight from villages between December 15 and February 2
can be illustrated by the following data:
Mass exodus from villages and collective farms occurred in 215 raions (the number of raions is not specified for the Autonomous Moldovan SSR). In total, 94,433 persons fled. Among them:
Mass exodus from villages and collective farms occurred in 215 raions (the number of raions is not specified for the Autonomous Moldovan SSR). In total, 94,433 persons fled. Among them:
Collective farmers - 31,454
Private farmers - 44,454
Kulaks - 8,039
Collective farm activists - 1,017
Private farmers - 44,454
Kulaks - 8,039
Collective farm activists - 1,017
[…] Most of those fleeing are private
farmers and kulaks who have failed to fulfill their grain procurement
obligations and are afraid of facing repressions. In the cases of
fleeing collective farmers, most have a small number of workdays and
attribute their exodus to poor material conditions, shortage of bread
and concerns over problems with food supplies.
People fleeing villages are predominantly headed for large industrial centers and areas of new construction.
People fleeing villages are predominantly headed for large industrial centers and areas of new construction.
DA SBU, “Holodomor 1932-1933 v Ukrayini” collection of documents.
<Index>
#57 Table on deaths and cannibalism due to famine in Havrysh, Sosonka and Yakushinetska villages, Vinnytsia oblast
February to August, 1933
REGISTER OF DEATHSs
Surname, name, patronymic
|
Died
|
Age
|
Place of residence
|
Trade
|
Place of work
|
Place of death
|
Cause of death
|
| Stashko Vasyl Dmytrov Y ch |
28.II.1933
|
5
|
Sosonka village | farmer | own farm | — | from famine |
| Kopytko Martokha Andriyivna |
21.III.1933
|
48
|
Sosonka village | farmer | own farm | — | from famine |
| Kukhar Ivan Nikiforovich |
28.III.1993
|
5
|
Khmilova village | farmer | "Lenin's Legacy" collective farm | at home | sudden death |
| Paseka Porfyri Tymkovich |
5.IV.1933
|
50
|
Yakuzhynets village | farmer | "October 13" collective farm | at home | sudden death |
| Stashko Danylo Martynovych |
9.V.1933
|
42
|
Sosonka village
|
farmer | artel member | at home | from famine |
| Romanenko Ivan Semenovych |
23.V.1933
|
48
|
Sosonka village | farmer | individual farm | on the road | from famine |
| Pukas Marko Zakharovych |
26.V.1933
|
44
|
Havryshivska s/r | farmer | collective farm | at home | from famine |
| R. Todoska |
11.VI.1933
|
6
|
Sosonka village | farmer | individual farm | — | village council and police determined that father killed and ate child |
| R. Hanna |
12.VI.1933
|
3
|
Sosonka village | farmer | individual farm | — | father killed for food |
| Zakharevich Hryhori Tymkovich |
12.VI.1933
|
7
|
Sosonka village | farmer | individual farm | — | killed by cannibal |
| Kravets Petro Vasylovych |
6.VIII 1933
|
10
|
Lysohora village | farmer | individual farm | from famine |
DA Vinnitsa oblast, fond Р-927, list 1,
file 181, sheets 5, 9; file 182, sheets 4, 6; file 185, sheets 4, 9;
fond Р-2061, list 1, file 292, sheet 13; file 294, sheet 2; file 415,
sheet 16; fond Р-2067, list 1, file 93, sheet 8;
Collectivization and famine in Ukraine.1929-1933. (Kyiv, 1992, 734 pp) Kolektyvizatsia i holod na Ukraini 1929-1933, p. 613.
<Index>
#58 Resolution of the CC AUCP(b) Politburo on setting up a special GPU trio in the Ukrainian SSR*
March 10, 1933
Authorize the trio comprised of Comrades
Balitsky, Carlson and Leplevsky with the power to pass rulings of the
highest measure to protect society from insurgency and
counter-revolution in Ukraine.
RGASPI, fond 17, list 162, file 14, sheet 96.
* The three leaders of the GPU Ukrainian
SSR political police had the summary right to pass death sentences
without court hearings.
<Index>
#59 Report from Vinnytsia oblast GPU to the Ukrainian SSR GPU on the grave conditions with food supplies and population deaths
March 11, 1933
Back at the beginning of February, we
began registering significant difficulties with food supplies in a
number of raions of our oblast: Trostianets, Zhmerynka, Bratslav,
Kalynivka, Pishchane, Kopaihorod, Liubar, Berdychiv, Lytin,
Stanislavchyk, Makhnov, Nemyriv and others.
To date, Kopaihorod, Lytin, Lypovets, Kalynivka, Bratslav, Kazatyn and Trostianets raions have been hit the worst.
According to recent [but] incomplete
data, there are more than 1,000 starving collective farm families, and
nearly the same number of private farm families in numerous villages
throughout these raions.
There are many people swollen from famine, mostly children, among the above-mentioned families.
156 deaths caused by famine have been registered, including 102 collective farmer deaths.
In Suhaky, Kopaihorod raion, nine people
died from famine in one day on March 5, according to a report by that
raion administration. More than 100 people are swollen from starvation.
Almost all the dogs and cats have been eaten in that village.
Among the starving, we should single out
the collective farmers who had 300 to 400 working days but, as a result
of outrageous conditions in certain collective farms, received
extraordinarily little [food] (300 to 400 grams per day).
Particularly illustrative in this respect are the villages of:
Bahrianovtsi in Lytin raion, Trostianchyk
and Severynivka in Trostianets raion, and Nemyrintsi in Makhnov raion,
where pay per workday was extremely low due to systematic
misappropriation and squandering of grain.
Six incidents of cannibalism caused by
famine, in which parents killed their children and used the flesh for
food, have been registered.
In Pinkovka, poor collective farmer K., aged 50, killed his two daughters, aged seven and nine, and used their flesh for food. K. blamed the murder of his children on a long period of starvation. No foodstuffs were found during the search.
In Pinkovka, poor collective farmer K., aged 50, killed his two daughters, aged seven and nine, and used their flesh for food. K. blamed the murder of his children on a long period of starvation. No foodstuffs were found during the search.
On February 12 in Nemyriv raion, a
65-year old semi-kulak-private farmer D., a resident of Dubiny hamlet,
killed his 7-year old daughter and used the flesh for food together with
his 9-year old daughter. On February 15, he killed his second daughter
and consumed the flesh as food together with his wife. D. blamed the
famine for committing the murders. (There are other analogous
incidents).
There is an incident of a father consciously killing his two children because he had nothing to feed them:
In Lytin raion, in the early days of
February, poor private farmer K. lit a fire in the stove and closed the
chimney in order to kill his children, two daughters, aged five and
eight. The children began to suffocate and cry for help because of the
fumes then he strangled them with his own hands, after which he went to
the village council and declared his murders. During questioning he said
that he committed the murders because there was nothing to eat. No
foodstuffs were found during a search of his home.
Information received in the last few days
shows that there are very serious difficulties in supplying food to the
students of a number of educational institutions located in oblast
towns. Students are regularly leaving educational institutions because
of the difficulties with food supplies.
In Proskuriv, 16 individuals have
abandoned studies in the last month. This accounts for 40 percent of all
students. In Tulchyn: 163 students, which accounts for 30 percent. In
Berdychiv 343 students, and so on.
In Polonne raion, 13 incidents of
swelling from famine have been registered among workers at the pulp and
paper plant and porcelain factory.
The number of cases of grave difficulties
with food supplies and famine is constantly growing and expanding to a
larger number of villages and small towns.
Raion organizations have very low food
reserves (nothing at all, in most cases) so it is impossible to expect
them to provide any real relief.
Attempts by the oblast to find any food
resources whatsoever to help the most-affected population centers have
thus far yielded no tangible results due to extremely limited
opportunities.
I think there is an urgent need to supply
food relief in a centralized manner, taking into account that many of
the population centers affected by famine are located in immediate
proximity to the border.
Head, Vinnytsia oblast GPU
Sokolynsky
Sokolynsky
TsDAHO Ukrayiny, fond 1, list 20, file 6274, sheets 146-148;
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv pp.422-424
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv pp.422-424
<Index>
#60 Report from the Ukrainian SSR GPU on problems with food supplies and raions affected by famine in Ukraine (excerpt)
March 12, 1993
According to data reported in February
and March, problems with food supplies were registered in 738 population
centers of 139 raions, where 11,067 families are starving.
Among the starving, 17,308 people are suffering from acute illnesses due to malnutrition.
In the same period, 2,487 people died of famine.
The largest number of famine cases was
registered at the end of February and at the beginning of March. In some
places this phenomenon has grown to be massive in scale.
The following is a breakdown of figures according to separate oblasts of Ukraine:
Oblast
|
Number of raions
|
Number of affected pop. centers
|
Number of starving families
|
Including those sick (number)
|
Dead
|
Dnipropetrovsk
|
35
|
336
|
6436
|
16211
|
1700
|
Kyiv
|
27
|
75
|
1363
|
253
|
417
|
Vinnytsia
|
20
|
82
|
325
|
201
|
59
|
Donetsk
|
29
|
83
|
573
|
409
|
263
|
Odesa
|
14
|
32
|
131
|
83
|
11
|
Kharkiv
|
5
|
20
|
116
|
151
|
37
|
AMSSR [Moldova]
|
9
|
110
|
1823
|
--
|
--
|
Totals
|
139
|
738
|
110674
|
17308
|
2487
|
Dnipropetrovsk and Kyiv oblasts, and the
Autonomous Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic are most affected by food
supply problems. The number of starving families afflicted by disease
and death is particularly striking in Dnipropetrovsk oblast.
Collective farmers prevail among the
starving. They primarily include multi-family homesteads that earned a
small number of workdays. Incidents of famine among collective farmers
who earned a large number of workdays have also been registered, but
they did not receive food supplies from the collective farms due to
squandering and embezzlement of grain during the harvest campaign.
Among private farmers, multi-family and
primarily poor households are experiencing problems with food supplies.
Lately, most of them have not been engaged in farming.
Starving families use various food
substitutes (corn cobs and stalks, millet pods, dried straw, herbs,
rotten watermelons and beetroots, potato peelings, acacia pods, etc.) as
food. Incidents of eating the flesh of cats, dogs and dead horses have
been registered. Twenty-eight incidents of cannibalism have been
registered. Most of them occurred in the last days of February and at
the beginning of March: 19 of 28 cannibalism cases occurred in Kyiv
oblast.
In February, 13 incidents of necrophagia were also registered.
In February, 13 incidents of necrophagia were also registered.
In the raions where famine was observed,
special commissions were set up to find resources and provide immediate
aid. Oblast organizations have allotted food resources to the raions
most affected by problems with food supplies.
Deputy Head, Ukrainian SSR GPU
Secret Political Department, Aleksandrovsky
Secret Political Department, Aleksandrovsky
TsDAHO Ukrayiny, fond 1, list 20, file 6274, sheets 149-158;
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv pp.429-433;
Tragedy of the Soviet countryside. Collectivization and dekulakization, documents and materials in five volumes. Vol. 3. (Мoscow, 2001, 1007 pp) Tragedia sovietskoi derevni. Kolektyvizatsia i raskulachivanie. Dokumenty i materialy: v 5 tomakh pp.653-655
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv pp.429-433;
Tragedy of the Soviet countryside. Collectivization and dekulakization, documents and materials in five volumes. Vol. 3. (Мoscow, 2001, 1007 pp) Tragedia sovietskoi derevni. Kolektyvizatsia i raskulachivanie. Dokumenty i materialy: v 5 tomakh pp.653-655
<Index>
#61 Report from the Peoples’ Commissariat of Land to the CC CP(b)U on famine and death in Kyiv oblast
March 14, 1933
Further to my report dated March 12 on
the state of affairs in Uman and Bila Tserkva raions, I am reporting the
following information received today from Comrade Rozanov, head of the
GPU for Kyiv oblast, concerning the general state of affairs in the
oblast.
Incidents of famine and its consequences
have been observed in 32 to 34 raions. In 16 raions – there have been
123 registered incidents of cannibalism and necrophagia (including 64
incidents of cannibalism).
In Bila Tserkva raion – 9,603 people swollen from hunger (1,525 people are immobile).
In Buky raion – 3,878 people are starving (3,736 people are immobile). In February and March, 742 people died from famine.
In Smela raion – 404 people are starving badly (203 people are swelling from starvation).
In Pereyasliv raion – 1,113 people are swollen from hunger. 238 people have died from famine.
In Bohuslav raion – 1,931 families are starving.
In the village of Pishchane, Zolotonosha raion – 639 families are starving.
In the village of Sevastianivka, Khrystynivka raion – 250 people are swelling from starvation.
In Lysianka raion – 57 families are starving (96 people are swelling from starvation).
This data is just an illustration based on various sources. No records are being kept.
Widespread beggary and vagrancy have been
observed in the towns. Many workers are starving. The numbers of
workers swollen from hunger are as follows: in Zhytomyr – 134 people, in
Bila Tserkva – 20 people employed at the May First Factory; in Vasylkiv
– 25 people employed at a tannery. The situation is no better in other
towns.
In Kyiv, the number of corpses collected
off the streets is as follows: 400 in January, 518 in February, 249 in
the first ten days of March. In the last few days, parents have been
abandoning on average 100 children.
Today, together with the Kyiv oblast
committee of CP(b)U, I will complete the assessment of the required
volumes of assistance and tomorrow I am going to Kharkiv.
Prior to addressing the issue in general,
it is necessary to supply a significant amount of food relief to Kyiv
oblast without delay, as I mentioned in my previous report.
The situation here is very serious and requires urgent attention.
Peoples’ Commissar for Agriculture, Ukrainian SSR
Odyntsev
Odyntsev
TsDAHO Ukrayiny, fond 1, list 20, file 6274, sheets 176-177;
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv pp.440-441
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv pp.440-441
<Index>
#62 Report from the Political Section, Donetsk oblast Land Department to the CP(b)U oblast committee on food shortages, deaths and cannibalism
April 19, 1933
According to reports from the heads of
MTS [machine tractor station] political departments, incidents of death
and cannibalism have been observed in a number of raions due to the lack
of food supplies, including the following separate incidents:
According to the Belokurakan MTS
political report dated April 6, the number of destitute people is
roughly 2,452 in the Karl Marx, Comintern, Red Breadwinner, New Life,
Stalin, and Red Flag Collective Farms. From January to March, 578 people
died of malnutrition at these collective farms. They included 218
children, 82 elderly and 189 able-bodied people. Incidents of
cannibalism have been observed, as illustrated by the following facts:
on March 28, collective farmer Luka Babenko cut off his deceased
brother’s head, threw his hands and legs into the river, and used the
rest for food.
Iryna Khrypunova throttled her nine year-old granddaughter and cooked her internal organs. Anton Khrypunov removed his dead eight year-old sister’s internal organs and ate them. A number of other incidents can also be recalled.
Iryna Khrypunova throttled her nine year-old granddaughter and cooked her internal organs. Anton Khrypunov removed his dead eight year-old sister’s internal organs and ate them. A number of other incidents can also be recalled.
According to Starobelsk MTS data, 54
people died due to lack of food in collective farms of the village of
Pleshchane and 96 in the village of Shulhine.
According to Osynovo MTS data, in
collective farms in the villages of Pysarivka and Bulashovka, 18 and 30
people died. Local and raion organizations provide insufficient
assistance. Incidents of absence from work have been registered. There
are concerns that the sowing campaign will be impacted if no measures
are taken.
Bringing this to your attention, I request you provide appropriate instructions.
Head, Political Section, Oblast Land Department, Kudriavtsev
Secretary, Tolmachova
Secretary, Tolmachova
DA Donetsk oblast, fond 326, list 1, file 130, sheet 47;
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv pp.494-495
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv pp.494-495
<Index>
#63 Resolution of the USSR SNK on food and fodder assistance to Ukraine
April 26, 1933
The USSR Council of Peoples’ Commissars adopts the following resolution:
1. To supply 850,000 poods of rye to
collective farms and private farmers in Ukraine for processing sugar
beets, including 120,000 poods for the processing of collective farm
sugar beets.
Food relief to collective farms and
private farmers for processing sugar beets shall be distributed among
the oblasts as follows:
| Vinnytsia oblast |
260,000 poods
|
| Kyiv |
160,000 poods
|
| Kharkiv |
210,000 poods
|
| Chernihiv |
45,000 poods
|
| Odesa |
45,000 poods
|
| AMSSR [Moldava] |
10,000 poods
|
| [Total] |
730,000 poods
|
An additional 100,000 poods shall be supplied to Kyiv oblast as part of the oblast’s unused seed loan.
2. To supply the following oblasts in Ukraine with rye, in addition to the food relief that has already been provided:
2. To supply the following oblasts in Ukraine with rye, in addition to the food relief that has already been provided:
| Odesa oblast |
100,000 poods
|
| Donetsk |
100,000 poods
|
| Vinnitsa |
150,000 poods
|
3. To supply 1,800,000 poods of oats to
collective farms in Ukraine, in addition to the fodder assistance that
has already been provided:
| Dnipropetrovsk oblast |
250,000 poods
|
| Kyiv |
350,000 poods
|
| Vinnytsia |
300,000 poods
|
| Kharkiv |
350,000 poods
|
| Odesa |
250,000 poods
|
| Donetsk |
250,000 poods
|
| AMSSR [Moldova] |
50,000 poods
|
| [Total] |
1,800,000 poods
|
4. Rye and oats shall be supplied from
the reserves of the Committee of Reserves; towards this end, the
Committee of Reserves shall transfer 1,800,000 poods of oats from
Western Oblast to Ukraine.
5. Rye and oats shall be supplied as
loans on condition that they shall be returned, in-kind, in the fall of
1933; administrative and transport costs incurred by the state shall be
calculated in the amount of 10 poods per every 100 poods of food and
fodder loans.
Zahotzerno’s expenses from extending the loans shall be covered from the SNK USSR’s reserve fund.
Zahotzerno’s expenses from extending the loans shall be covered from the SNK USSR’s reserve fund.
Chairman, Council of Peoples’ Commissars USSR V. Molotov (Skryabin)
Executive officer, Council of Peoples’ Commissars USSR, I. Miroshnikov
Executive officer, Council of Peoples’ Commissars USSR, I. Miroshnikov
GARF, fond 5446, list 18, file 468, sheets 37-38.
<Index>
#64 Report from the Consul of Italy in Kharkiv to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy on “Famine and the Ukrainian Situation” (excerpts)
May 31, 1933
Famine continues to threaten massive
destruction of the population and it’s simply impossible to comprehend
how the world can remain indifferent to such a tragedy; meanwhile the
international press, which is persistent in demanding international
condemnation of Germany for its so-called brutal persecution of Jews,
remains timidly silent about this mass murder organized by the Soviet
government where Jews play a fairly important if not leading role.
What is incontrovertible here is that this famine was caused primarily by an artificially bad harvest aimed at “teaching the peasants a lesson” […]
What is incontrovertible here is that this famine was caused primarily by an artificially bad harvest aimed at “teaching the peasants a lesson” […]
There were three apparent motives for such a policy:
1. Passive resistance among the peasantry to collectivization;
2. Belief that this “ethnographic material” will never be suitable for turning into integral Communists;
3. The more or less openly-acknowledged need and convenience of denationalizing raions where Ukrainian and German self-consciousness has been awakened and the resulting threats of potential political hardships in the future. In order to keep the empire together it is better for the Russian population to be dominant. […]
2. Belief that this “ethnographic material” will never be suitable for turning into integral Communists;
3. The more or less openly-acknowledged need and convenience of denationalizing raions where Ukrainian and German self-consciousness has been awakened and the resulting threats of potential political hardships in the future. In order to keep the empire together it is better for the Russian population to be dominant. […]
I believe it imperative to provide a factual account of the situation:
Comrade Frenkel, a member of the GPU
collegium, confidentially shared information with a mutual acquaintance
that nearly 250 corpses of famine victims are collected in Kharkiv each
night. I can personally attest to seeing trucks carrying 10 to 15
corpses pass by the Consulate during the night.
Trucks pulled up to the gates of three
large buildings being built near the royal Consulate, and two hired
hands with pitchforks went looking for the dead. I saw them use the
pitchforks to pick up seven people off the ground: two men, one woman
and four children. The others, who woke up in time, quickly disappeared.
During this operation one of the workers asked me: “You don’t see this
where you come from, do you?”
On the morning of the 21st, around 30
corpses were dumped like dirty rags on a pile of filth and human
excrement near the market gates by the river. On the morning of the
23rd, I counted 51 corpses there. One newborn was sucking milk from the
breast of its gray-faced, dead mother. […]
A week ago a special service was created
to catch unsupervised children. In addition to the villagers streaming
to the city, as there is no chance of surviving in the rural areas,
there are also children brought here and left by parents who went back
to their villages to die. They hope that someone in the city will
provide shelter and take care of them. Lately, these children could be
seen crawling and crying on the sidewalks. […]
Last week, city workers wearing white
aprons were mobilized. Walking through the city, they gather children
and bring them to the nearest police precinct, where one will often see
scenes of desperation, hear screaming and crying. There is a police
precinct in front of the Consulate. Delirious screams emanate from
within: “I don’t want to go to the barracks for the dead! Let me die in
peace!”
Around midnight they are transported in
trucks to the Northern Donets freight station. Those caught during the
day in the sweep through the city are joined by children gathered from
the villages and trains, peasant families and lone oldsters.
There are health workers at the station
responsible for “sorting” (“They are the heroes of the day,” one doctor
told me. Among the health workers, 40 percent have died from typhus that
they contracted while on the job.)
Those who are not bloated and who stand a
chance of revival are sent to the barracks on Kholodna Hora [Cold
Mountain] where nearly 8,000 people, mostly children, live in agony on
beds of hay in sheds.
A doctor who works there told me that
people are given milk and soup, but clearly not in sufficient amounts
and irregularly, “as available.” Between 80 and 100 people die there
every day. […]
The swollen are shuttled on freight
trains to rural areas 50 to 60 kilometres outside the city where nobody
can see them die. The railcars are filled up and bolted shut. It often
happens that, after the cars are filled up, they stand there for two
days. A few days ago, a railroad worker heard a noise while passing one
the railcars. Looking closer, he found a poor wretch sitting inside and
pleading to be freed because of the unbearable stench of the corpses. It
turned out he was the only person left alive; he was taken to die in
another car, where some people were still alive.
Upon reaching the destination, the
railcars are unloaded and the bodies thrown into large pits. I was
assured that people were seen still alive among the dead; they were very
weak and tossed into pits still breathing and convulsing in their last
spasms. Nevertheless, the gravediggers kept working and unloading the
bodies. I learned these details from the health workers and can thus
guarantee the reliability of this information.
An average 30 people die daily in the
Kholodna Hora prison. In the village of Hrakovo, located 50 kilometres
outside of Kharkiv, only 200 of 1,300 residents remain.
It seems that the Poltava area bore the
most horrific brunt, even worse than the area outside Kharkiv. In
Poltava, even the doctors are beginning to bloat from the lack of food.
[…]
Conclusion: the current cataclysm will
lead to the colonization of Ukraine primarily by Russians. This will
change the country’s ethnographic nature. It is quite possible that, in
the foreseeable future, nobody will talk about Ukraine or the Ukrainian
nation, meaning that the country will be de facto transformed into a
Russian region.
With utmost respect,
Royal consul
Gradenigo
Royal consul
Gradenigo
Lettere da Kharkov, La carestia in
Ucraina e nel Caucaso del Nord nei rapporti dei diplomatici italiani,
1932-1933. A cura di Andrea Graziosi. - Torino, 1991, рp. 168-174.
Translated from Italian into Ukrainian by M. Varvartsev.
<Index>
#65 Report from the Peoples’ Commissariat of Healthcare to the CP(b)U on the state of public health in Kyiv oblast in connection with famine
June 3, 1933
The condition of the population of Kyiv
oblast due to problems with food supplies can be illustrated by
statistics from oblast health commissions and departments in 66 raions
considered to be most grave.
March25
|
April 5
|
April 15
|
|
Number of affected Villages
|
1,2141
|
1,378
|
1,577
|
Total number of starving
|
398,201
|
474,540
|
493,644
|
Children
|
178,544
|
245,283
|
262,109
|
Adults
|
164,152
|
208,741
|
210,138
|
Total number swelling from hunger
|
88,721
|
101,683
|
97,715
|
Requiring hospitalization
|
31,678
|
37,588
|
36,632
|
Children
|
16,269
|
19,026
|
18,698
|
Adults
|
10,768
|
14,066
|
13,952
|
Hospitalized
|
11,294
|
22,248
|
24,168
|
Children
|
5,457
|
14,158
|
15,068
|
Adults
|
6,588
|
6,679
|
8,135
|
Died since January 1
|
14,548
|
26,479
|
27,809
|
Treated back to health
|
--
|
7,776
|
19,900
|
1. Analysis of these figures shows
growing numbers of affected villages and starving people. While the
number of starving adults has stabilized, the number of starving
children has grown significantly since April 15. The number of those
swollen from starvation is in decline, the number of people that require
hospitalization remains the same, and hospitalization has increased,
particularly of children; deaths have declined noticeably in the last 10
days.
2. The following raions suffered most:
Bohuslav (30,917 starving), Bila Tserkva (30,536) Popelnyan (20,000),
Stavyshchan (17,129), Oratov (16,338), Buk (14,920), Obukhiv (14,113),
Rzhyshchiv (13,987), Uman (13,204), Rokytnia (12,242), Skvir (16,236),
Talnov (10,591) Tetiyev (10,480) and Baban (19,064). In other raions,
the figures are less than 10,000. The total number of affected Group One
raions is 34, Group Two – 17 and Group Three – 15.
3. These figures have to be viewed
critically, because the numbers of people actually in distress have been
underestimated in some raions (e.g.: Tetiyev raion 10,480 [reported]
while there are really more than 22,000) and overestimated in other
raions (Bila Tserkva reported 30,536, while in reality no more than
20,000 to 22,000). Although the miscalculations do not have a major
impact on the total number of people starving in the oblast, they are
important for the allocation of foodstuffs and other forms of government
relief.
4. The figures for the people that have
died are unreliable, as a review of materials in the regions showed that
numbers were much higher. For example, in Skvir raion 802 people were
reported to have died from January 1 to March 1, while a review on the
ground revealed 1,773 deaths; in Volodarskiy raion 742 deaths were
reported as of March 1, when in fact more than 3,000 people had died.
5. The situation with infants, pre-school
and young school-aged children should be viewed as the greatest threat;
these dangerous conditions are attributable to the bestial attitude of
adults to children and grossly insufficient assistance for children in
terms of both quality and quantity.
6. Child homelessness requires special
attention. There are more than 5,500 children in healthcare institutions
alone, representing no more than 40 percent of all homeless children,
while the budget has enough to support only 1,000 children. Abandonments
[of children] are on the rise and will persist for the next two to
three months.
Deputy Peoples’ Commissar of Health, Ukrainian SSR, Kharmandian
TsDAHO Ukrayiny, fond 1, list 20, file 6276, pages 1-7;
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv pp.525-530
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv pp.525-530
<Index>
#66 Summary of reports from MTS Political Sections in Kyiv oblast on famine, death and the anti-Soviet moods among collective farmers (excerpt) *
June 14, 1933
[…] This past spring the oblast
encountered serious problems with food supplies. The food relief
received from the CC AUCP(b) – a total volume of 19,401 tons – played a
crucial role in alleviating the enormous food supply problems faced by
Kyiv oblast collective farms during the crucial period of preparing and
executing the sowing campaign (March and April). Nevertheless, the
situation with collective farm food reserves grew significantly worse in
many of the oblast’s raions, especially in May and June. In some raions
the number of those swollen and dead from famine is growing to
dangerous proportions and are having a definite impact on the execution
of agricultural and political campaigns... The heads of POs [local
Machine Tractor Station political departments] have written the
Political Section [of the oblast MTS] about mass starvation and the
dying out of entire villages. For instance, the head of the Petrovsky
MTS PO, Kamensky raion, writes:
“...In the last month-and-a-half,
incidents of death have been massive in scale. In Rozumievka, 37 people
died in the month of May. The situation is especially difficult in the
Shliakh Kolhospnyka collective farm of this village. In the Bolshevik
Collective Farm in Osota, 120 people died in May. Incidents of mass
death have become more frequent than before in the villages of Holykovo,
Boltyshka and others. In total 3,336 persons have died in the
collective farms of 27 villages of this MTS. Very many children are
dying. While in March and April we managed to prevent child deaths
thanks to oblast and local aid, in May and the first ten days of June,
the rate of mortality was unbelievable: 209 persons in 27 villages.”
The PO of Piatihorsk MTS, Tetiyev raion, reports:
The PO of Piatihorsk MTS, Tetiyev raion, reports:
“...Mortality is reaching catastrophic
proportions. In the small village of Nenadykha alone, 113 people died in
20 days during the month of May. Medical clinics have been closed. Many
people, especially children, are swollen from famine. They cannot work.
There have been many cases of female workers falling in the fields and
dying either at home or in the fields. In nurseries, nearly 80 to 70
percent of children are gaunt and swollen. Many schoolchildren are so
swollen that that they have a hard time walking to school. Urgent relief
is required, especially for the children...”
“...Lately the mortality rate has
increased significantly. Up to 2,000 people died in 10 days of June.
This is significantly more than during the whole month of May. Incidents
of death at work have become more frequent than before...”
(June 14, 1933 letter from the head of Tetiev MTS PO)
(June 14, 1933 letter from the head of Tetiev MTS PO)
“...The number of villages requiring
relief has grown: 15 of 17 villages are afflicted; 1,000 people died in
the raion during the month of April; 459 people died in the first five
days of May. There have been incidents of death during work in the
fields. Feeding stations are being closed due to lack of produce. Urgent
food aid is needed.”
(letter from the head of Tarashcha MTS PO)
(letter from the head of Tarashcha MTS PO)
“...The rate of mortality has increased
in collective farms. Not only slackers, but also good collective farmers
are dying. In Sloboda, 120 people died in 10 days. The situation is the
same in other villages. People are dying right in the fields while
working. Child mortality rates have increased as well, which is
particularly dangerous. There is no food aid in the raion. Workforce
shortages have been reported in some villages and collective farms.
Urgent food aid is needed.”
(report from the head of the Tetiev MTS PO)
(report from the head of the Tetiev MTS PO)
“...In three villages, Zelena Dubrava,
Maidanivka and Hnyzets, acute famine and mortality caused by exhaustion
have not been eliminated. In fact their frequency is growing. For
instance, in Maidanivka village, 19 people died in March and another 28
in April; 61 people, including 24 able-bodied collective farmers, died
in 26 days of May. In these villages there have been incidents of death
in the field while working and on the way home from work.”
(report from the head of the Olshanka MTS PO, Petrovsky raion).
(report from the head of the Olshanka MTS PO, Petrovsky raion).
Similar incidents have been reported by
the MTS stations in other raions. According to statistics from 15 MTS
political departments, more than 6,000 people have died from exhaustion.
[. . .]
Deputy head, Political section, Kyiv oblast MTS,
M. Yehorov
M. Yehorov
TsDAHO Ukrayiny, fond 1, list 20, file 6276, sheets 55-60.
* The report was sent to Lazar
Kaganovich, Agriculture Department, CC AUCP(b); Stanislaw Kosior,
General Secretary of the CC CP(b)U Politburo and the chairmen of the
Political Departments of the USSR and Ukrainian SSR Peoples’
Commissariats of Agriculture.
<Index>
#67 Report from the Consul of Italy in Kharkiv to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy on “Famine and Sanitary Conditions” (excerpt)
July 10, 1933
The current situation in Ukraine is
horrific. Apart from larger cities and raions within a fifty kilometer
radius of cities, the country is engulfed in famine, typhus and
dysentery. There are also cases of cholera and even plague which, until
recently, were sporadic in number […]
The famine has decimated half the rural population.
Police apprehend fleeing peasants with
livid brutality (I have noticed that the urban population willingly take
part in this hunt for villagers, either because of some
incomprehensible feeling of self-defense, or under the influence of
crafty propaganda, or an overwhelming desire to inflict torture). If
somebody tries to escape from the police transports, there are always a
dozen city residents prepared to chase him down, beat him up and turn
him in to the police. There are orders prohibiting doctors from
administering medical treatment to villagers in the cities.
Two thousand such poor souls are rounded
up every day and shipped out during the night. Entire families, that
came to the city in the last hope of avoiding death from starvation, are
mercilessly held in barracks for one or two days and then transported,
hungry, 50 kilometers from Kharkiv and thrown into rain-formed gullies.
Many of them can no longer move and
simply die on the spot; some manage to escape and others are fortunate
enough to make it back to the city where they end up begging for food.
One of them told me about an area located between the ponds beyond
Rai-Yelenivka, a four-hour walk from the nearest railway station. Every
three to four days, a team of gravediggers is dispatched there to bury
the dead.
Some doctors whom I know confirmed that
death rates in the villages often reach 80 percent, but never less than
50 percent. Kyiv, Poltava and Sumy regions were most afflicted by the
famine and can be described as depopulated.
I am adding yet another name to the list
of dead villages: Lutova near Kharkiv.* Prior to the famine its
population was 1,500. Today, it is just under 90.
As for sanitary conditions, they can be
no worse than their current state. Doctors are prohibited from speaking
about typhus and death from starvation.
They are also prohibited from compiling statistics that may be interesting from the scientific point of view. Nonetheless, I was able to obtain the following information about pathologies due to undernourishment. People who are unable to secure bread (very black bread with various additives) gradually grow weaker and die of heart failure without any signs of disease. Meanwhile, those that consumed only fluids and milk experience gradual swelling of their joints and legs. They also die from heart failure.
They are also prohibited from compiling statistics that may be interesting from the scientific point of view. Nonetheless, I was able to obtain the following information about pathologies due to undernourishment. People who are unable to secure bread (very black bread with various additives) gradually grow weaker and die of heart failure without any signs of disease. Meanwhile, those that consumed only fluids and milk experience gradual swelling of their joints and legs. They also die from heart failure.
There are frequent cases of
hallucinations when people mistake children for animals, slaughter and
eat them. Those who managed to regain their strength using this kind of
food did not recall wanting to eat their own children and denied ever
having such intentions. […]
Royal Consul Sergio Gradenigo
Lettere da Kharkov, La carestia in
Ucraina e nel Caucaso del Nord nei rapporti dei diplomatici italiani,
1932-1933. A cura di Andrea Graziosi. - Torino, 1991, рp. 189-191.
Translated from Italian into Ukrainian by M. Varvartsev.
* The author was most likely referring to the village of Liutivka, Zolochiv raion
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#68 Resolution of SNK USSR on resettlement to Kuban, Terek and Ukraine
August 31, 1933
The Council of Peoples’ Commissars of the Union of SSR resolves:
The All-Union Resettlement Committee of
the Council of Peoples’ Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics shall organize the resettlement of 10,000 families to Kuban
and Terek, and 15,000 to 20,000 families to Ukraine (Steppe) by the
beginning of 1934.
Chairman, Council of Peoples’ Commissars of the Union of SSR V. Molotov (Skryabin)
Executive Director, Council of Peoples’ Commissars of the Union of SSR I. Miroshnikov
Executive Director, Council of Peoples’ Commissars of the Union of SSR I. Miroshnikov
GARF, fond 5446, list 18, file 470, page 185.
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#69 Resolution of CC CP(b)U Politburo on additional resettlement of Steppe raions (excerpt)
September 11, 1933
Prepare the following numbers of added
resettlements into the steppe regions during the fourth quarter of 1933:
22,000 families to Dnipropetrovsk, 9,000 families to Odesa and 4,000
families to Donetsk oblasts.
Recruit additional resettlers from among
those collective farmers, laborers and private farmers who are willing
to join the collective farms of the Steppe.
Establish the following recruitment targets: 8,000 families each from Kyiv and Chernihiv oblasts and 6,000 families from Vinnytsia oblast.
Establish the following recruitment targets: 8,000 families each from Kyiv and Chernihiv oblasts and 6,000 families from Vinnytsia oblast.
Conduct additional resettlement to
Dnipropetrovsk oblast from Kyiv and Chernihiv oblasts; to Odesa oblast
from Vinnytsia and Kyiv oblasts and into Donetsk from Chernihiv oblast.
[…]
TsDAHO Ukrayiny, fond 1, list 6, file 321, sheets 6-9.
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#70 Report from Otto Schiller, agricultural expert, Embassy of Germany in the USSR to the German Ministry of food and agriculture (excerpt)*
September 18, 1933
FAMINE IN THE SOVIET UNION
[...] The causes of the famine
catastrophe will not be found in natural events, that is to say a bad
harvest. Even if one disregards official and other harvest estimates and
assumes the lowest estimate, then rational distribution would have
provided if not a full diet, then at least enough food to avoid large
scale death by famine. Grain exports, which villagers often blame for
the famine, are not large enough with respect to the general harvest to
explain the food catastrophe. Last year, [exports] were 1.3 million
tonnes with a general harvest collection of nearly 60 million tonnes.
The accusation that large volumes were put away in state reserves for
military purposes during the last year is also dubious because the
capacity of state storage facilities cannot be expanded so quickly.
The real reasons for the famine are being
kept hidden; they can only be explained by enormous organizational and
distribution errors and overexertion of grain procurement measures.
Everywhere in the starving areas, villagers share the view that the
harvest provided enough food and that famine was caused solely through
brutal requisition methods. It remains to be seen whether this was due
to gross abuses by local government bodies and local chaos, or on orders
from the top, the last kernel of grain was systematically extracted
from the villages, to bring the villagers to their knees through famine
and force them to work in collective farms as was described in my
18.7.1933 report.
It is very difficult to provide even
approximate figures for famine deaths. The Soviet government cannot
provide any exact information because many of the starving died on the
road or were buried without identification and death registration. In
many cases, it’s difficult to tell whether starvation or disease was the
cause of death. An approximate notion of the scale of famine deaths can
be provided by the fact that the above-mentioned zone of famine in
territorial size comprises nearly a third of the entire area, and half
the entire population, of European Russia. Nearly every village has seen
deaths from famine; in the worst areas, 25 to 50 percent of the
population died out, while in other villages, only individual cases of
death from famine were established. Based on village population
reduction ratios, the victims of the hunger catastrophe number in the
millions. I would, on the other hand, not consider the quoted number of
10 million deaths to be an exaggeration. In addition, most of the
remaining population in starving areas has serious health problems due
to the hardships endured. This is foremost the case with children, a
significant number of whom, crippled by famine, will never have the
chance to develop into normal human beings.
Within the area of starvation, the forms
of famine are the same everywhere, but gradation differs significantly
according to location. Particularly hard hit was the western part of
[Soviet] Ukraine, a large part of the Northern Caucasus and some places
of the Lower Volga (left bank and lands along the mountainside). In
these worst areas, the famine has caused such significant damage to
agriculture through widespread death and destruction of villages, that
even should famine disappear, the normal future development of these
villages seems impossible without repopulating and rebuilding. But these
areas are not significant in size. [...]
Moscow, 18 September 1933
Original signed by Schiller
Original signed by Schiller
Der ukrainische Hunger-Holocaust: Stalins
verschwiegner Völkermord 1932/33 an 7 Millionen ukrainischen Bauern im
Spiegel geheimgehaltener Akten d. dt. Auswärtigen Amtes; e.
Dokumentation; aus d. Beständen d. Polit. Archivs im Auswärtigen Amt,
Bonn / hrsg. u. eingeleitet von D. Zlepko. – Sonnenbühl: Wild, 1988. –
pp. 194-196. Translated from German to Ukrainian by M. Dubyk.
* A copy of this report was also sent to German Ministry of Foreign Affairs
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# 71 Letter from Kaganovich to Stalin on resettlements to areas of the Northern Caucasus and Ukraine depopulated by the Holodomor (excerpt)
October 2, 1933
Dear Comrade Stalin.
1) You inquired about the operational
tasks we’ve assigned the resettlement committee for 1933. At the end of
August, we ordered them to organize the resettlement of 10,000 to Kuban
and Terek in early1934 and 15,000 to 20,000 families to Ukraine’s
Steppe.*. After Comrade Muralov arrived, we called him out and became
convinced that he is currently recruiting from among army units only,
and has nothing organized on location. We instructed him to plan out the
entire campaign: identify resettlement locations, send people to
organize housing and all necessary equipment, provide a timetable with
exact deadlines, secure food, and so on.
He is to present all this in a few days.
We think that in the remaining three months of 1933 he will not be able
to do any more; thus we are not assigning him any additional tasks. It
may be necessary to organize spontaneous resettlement beginning with
some Middle Volga raions. This will have to be considered...
RGASPI, fond 558, list 11, file 741, sheets 80-81;
Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931-1936 (Moscow, 2001, 798 pp) Stalin i Kaganovich. Perepyska. 1931-1936 pp.370-371
Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931-1936 (Moscow, 2001, 798 pp) Stalin i Kaganovich. Perepyska. 1931-1936 pp.370-371
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#72 Resolution of the CC AUCP(b) Politburo on the resettlement of collective farmers within the Ukrainian SSR and from other oblasts of the USSR
December 9, 1933
1. Approve the proposal from the CC
CP(b)U, RNK Ukrainian SSR and the All-Union Resettlement Committee on
the internal Ukrainian resettlement of 16,000 homesteads in the months
of January, February and March of 1934 from the oblasts
| Chernihiv | -- | 7,000 families | to | Donetsk oblast | -- | 3,000 |
| to | Dnipropetrovsk oblast |
--
|
4,000 | |||
| Kyiv | -- | 6,000 families | to | Odesa oblast | -- | 2,000 |
| to | Dnipropetrovk oblast | -- | 2,000 | |||
| Vinnitsa | -- | 3,000 families | to | Kharkiv oblast | -- | 2,000 |
| to | Odesa oblast | -- | 1,000 |
This resettlement shall provide the same
benefits and conditions as resettlements from the Russian SFSR and
Belarusian SSR, except for reducing the exemption from paying taxes to
one year instead of three.
2. Order the Ukrainian SSR CC CP(b)U, RNK
and the Party and executive committees in Chernihiv, Kyiv and Vinnytsia
oblasts to complete recruitment of willing resettlers by 1.1.1934 and
for the Party and executive committees in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk,
Kharkiv and Odesa oblasts to repair 16,000 homes and yards for the
resettlers no later than 15.1.34.
3. Request the SNK USSR to supply the
materials necessary for the repairs of homes (glass, nails, timber) and
the money necessary for organizing resettlement.
4. Authorize the All-Union Resettlement
Committee to additionally resettle*, under the previously-established
terms, 3,000 homesteads from the Central Black Earth Oblast to Kharkiv
oblast and 300 Jewish farms from Western Oblast to Dnipropetrovsk
oblast.
RGASPI, fond 17, list 3, file 936, sheets 12-13.
* In August, 1933, the SNK USSR initially
ordered 20,000 families resettled in Ukraine’s Steppe. On December 29,
1933, the RNK reported the plan for resettling collective farmers in
Ukraine was over-performed at 104 percent (See Documents 68 and 73.)
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#73 Report of the All-Union Resettlement Committee on resettling collective farmers to Ukraine (with table)
December 29, 1933
Express. Secret.
To Head of GULAG OGPU Comrade Berman
To Head of GULAG OGPU Comrade Berman
The All-Union Resettlement Committee of
the SNK USSR is sending operational report No. 38 on resettlement to
Ukraine as of December 28 this year. In addition, the AURC of the SNK
reports that the proposed resettlement plan was performed by 104.76 % *.
In total 21,856 collective farms, 117,149 persons, 14,879 horses,
21,898 cows and 38,705 heads of other livestock (the latter includes
only swine and sheep) have been relocated. The report is attached.
Deputy Chairman, All-Union Resettlement Committee,
USSR SNK Rud’
USSR SNK Rud’
SUMMARY DATA ON ECHELONS OF RESETTLERS SENT TO UKRAINE AS OF DECEMBER 28, 1933:
Source
oblast |
Destination
oblast |
Number
|
% Plan Completion
|
||||
House-holds
|
Horses
|
Cows
|
other livestock
|
Echelons
|
|||
| Gorky | Odesa | 2,120 | 1,348 | 2,062 | 2,050 | 35 | 106 |
| Ivanov | Donetsk | 3,527 | 1,619 | 3,498 | 1,980 | 44 | 104 |
| BSSR | Odesa | 4,630 | 3,864 | 5,295 | 10,924 | 61 | 103 |
| C.Chornozem | Kharkiv | 4,800 | 2,329 | 3,472 | 5,644 | 80 | 106.6 |
| Western | Dnipropetrovsk | 6,679 | 5,719 | 7,571 | 18,097 | 109 | 102.7 |
1. On 28 December 1933, 329 echelons were
dispatched, 21,856 households, 117,149 family members, 14,879 horses,
21,898 cows and 38,705 heads of small livestock.
2. The plan for transporting collective farmers into Ukraine is complete and fulfilled by 104.7%.
Deputy chairman, All Union Resettlement Committee,
USSR SNK Rud’
USSR SNK Rud’
RGAE, fond 5675, list 1, file 33, sheet 56;
Collectivization and famine in Ukraine.1929-1933. (Kyiv, 1992, 734 pp) Kolektyvizatsia i holod na Ukraini 1929-1933 p. 642.
Collectivization and famine in Ukraine.1929-1933. (Kyiv, 1992, 734 pp) Kolektyvizatsia i holod na Ukraini 1929-1933 p. 642.
* As stated in the document. Further calculations show 104.076%
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Famine-Genocide Commemorative Committee
Ukrainian Canadian Congress
Toronto Branch
© November 2002
Ukrainian Canadian Congress
Toronto Branch
© November 2002
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